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For  the  5
th  takeover  wave,  European  M&As  were  expected  to  create  significant  takeover  value:  the 
announcement reactions were strongly positive for target shareholders (more than 35%) and the bidding 
shareholders also expected to gain a small though significant increase in market value of 0.5%. While, most 
of the expected takeover synergies are captured by the target firm shareholders, The combined value creation 
is significantly positive. However, the expected value strongly depends on the wave pattern, with optimistic 
expectations at the climax of the wave and a more pessimistic outlook at the decline. We establish that the 
characteristics of the target and bidding firms and of the bid itself have a significant impact on takeover 
returns. While some of our results have been documented for other markets of corporate control (e.g. US), a 
comparison of the UK and Continental European M&A markets reveals that the corporate environment is an 
important factor affecting the market reaction to takeovers: (i) In case a UK firm is taken over, the abnormal 
returns exceed those in bids involving a Continental European target. (ii) The presence of a large shareholder 
in the bidding firm has a significantly positive effect on the takeover returns in the UK and a negative one in 
Continental Europe. (iii) Weak investor protection and low disclosure environment in Continental Europe 
enable bidding firms to invent takeover strategies that allow them to act opportunistically towards target 
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1. Introduction 
The fifth global wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) which took place in the 1990s 
stands out as the largest and most diverse of the last century. For the first time, Continental European 
(hereafter CE) firms were as eager to participate in the market for corporate control as their US and 
UK counterparts, such that European takeover activity hit levels similar to those experienced in the 
US. Since the middle of 2003, takeover activity has picked up in Europe, continuing the industry 
consolidation trend of the 1990s. Despite these developments, empirical research on M&A activity 
remain mostly confined to the UK and US and there is little known about how well the Continental 
European market for corporate control performs relative to other regions.  
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  twofold.  First,  we  carry  out  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the 
performance of corporate takeovers conducted by European firms during the fifth takeover (1993-
2001).  Our  sample  comprises  2,419  mergers  and  acquisitions  that  involve  companies  from  28 
European countries, including those from Central and Eastern Europe. The performance of European 
M&As is measured by the changes in the value of bidding and target firms in the period around the 
transaction  announcement.  As  potential  determinants  of  the  takeover  gains  we  consider  the 
characteristics of the bidding and target firms and of the bid itself. This study contributes to the 
restricted  literature  on  European  M&As  in  several  ways.  First,  in  contrast  to  Goergen  and 
Renneboog (2004) who examine only the largest European M&As, this paper studies both large and 
small takeover transactions. Moeller et al. (2003) document that the focus on large takeovers may 
give an incomplete picture of the impact of acquisitions on shareholder wealth, as large acquisitions 
tend to be less profitable than the small ones. Second, we examine takeover performance over the 
different phases of the firth takeover wave. Indeed, a limitation of the existing European M&A 
studies (see e.g. Campa and Hernando, 2004) is their focus on takeovers conducted in the peak of the 
fifth takeover wave. For the US, Moeller et al. (2005) show that acquisitions in 1998-2001 generate 
large losses to bidding firms’ shareholders, while earlier transactions in that decade result in positive 
gains.     
The  second  purpose of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  whether  a  wide range  of  institutional 
structures and legal rules have an impact on how takeovers are perceived at their announcement. 
Continental European transactions are conducted in a corporate environment very different from that 
of  the  UK.  In  comparison  to  their  British  peers,  companies  from  the  Continent  have  a  more 
concentrated  ownership  structure  (Faccio  and  Lang  2002)  and  operate  in  an  environment  with 




insider trading regulation (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2004).
1 A growing literature advocates that the 
corporate environment influences the cost of capital, corporate performance, and the distribution of 
benefits among corporate stakeholders (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997, 2002; Mork et al., 2000; and 
Levine, 1998, 1999).
2 We argue that regulation is also likely to have an impact on the patterns of 
M&A activity. Hence, the main research question we ask in this paper is whether and to what extent 
the  specifics  of  CE  corporate  governance  and  regulatory  systems  (relative  to  those  of  the  UK) 
influence the anticipated performance of takeovers. 
In  a  nutshell,  our  main  findings  are  the  following.  We  find  that  European  M&As  are 
expected  to  create  takeover  synergies  since  their  announcements  trigger  substantial  share  price 
increases. However, most of the takeover gains are captured by the target firm shareholders: the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) at the announcement captured by the targets amount to 9% on 
average, considerably larger than the (still statistically significant) 0.5% accruing to the bidding 
firms. We establish that the characteristics of the target and bidding firms and of the bid itself have a 
significant impact on takeover returns. First, hostile takeovers and tender offers trigger substantially 
larger price reactions to the target shareholders than do friendly M&As. Second, investors discount 
the bidder and target’s share prices at the announcement of all-equity offers relative to cash bids. 
Third, target shareholders gain higher premiums in cross-border takeovers. Fourth, the acquisition of 
a private firm generates significantly positive abnormal returns for the bidder’s shareholders. We 
also demonstrate that takeovers occurring when takeover activity is slowing down trigger lower 
gains to both bidder and target shareholders than do deals at the beginning of the wave.  
While some of these results have been documented for other markets of corporate control 
(e.g. US), a comparison of the UK and CE M&A markets reveals that the corporate environment is 
an important factor affecting the market reaction to takeovers: (i) In case a UK firm is taken over, 
the abnormal returns exceed those in bids involving a CE target. This difference in premiums seems 
to be caused by a more strict takeover legislation in the UK than in the CE countries. The UK 
regulation protects the target shareholders better against expropriation by the bidder and gives them 
more  power  to  extract  higher  premiums  in  takeover  negotiations.  (ii)  The  presence  of  a  large 
shareholder in the bidding firm has a significantly positive effect on the takeover returns in the UK 
and a negative one in Continental Europe. This suggests that the market views the role of major 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that mentioned above characteristics of the corporate environment in CE countries are valid for 
the period of the 1990s and may be no longer true for the later (earlier) periods.  
2 The empirical literature documents that weak corporate governance combined with weak enforcement of the law 
distorts the efficient allocation of resources, undermines the ability of companies to compete internationally, and hinders 
investment and economic development.   4
shareholders differently in the two corporate governance regimes. (iii) Weak investor protection and 
low disclosure environment in Continental Europe enable bidding firms to invent takeover strategies 
that  allow  them  to  act  opportunistically  towards  target  firm’s  incumbent  shareholders;  more 
specifically, partial acquisitions and acquisitions with undisclosed terms of transaction.  Whereas 
these types of transactions are virtually non-existent in the UK, they prevail in a large number in CE 
countries.  We  find  that  such  transactions  lead  to  substantial  losses  to  the  shareholders  of  both 
bidding and target firms.                   
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we review the determinants of the 
share price reactions to takeover announcements and hypothesize potential differences between UK 
and CE M&As.  Section 3 describes the data sources, sample statistics, and methodology,  while 
section 4 investigates market reaction to takeover announcements and relates it to different takeover 
characteristics in a univariate analysis framework. In Section 5, we investigate the determinants of 
the announcement returns in a multivariate framework. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  The determinants of the market reaction to takeover announcements 
 
2.1 Predictions of the existing literature 
An  M&A  announcement  brings  new  information  to  the  market,  such  that  investors’ 
expectations about the firm’s prospects are updated and reflected in the share prices.  
Both the theoretical and empirical M&A literature have shown that a variety of attributes 
affect the value of bidding and target firms at the announcement of corporate takeovers.
3 Empirical 
studies, mainly based on UK and US mergers and acquisitions, document that changes in the share 
price of the bidding and target firms at the takeover announcement depend on the characteristics of 
the transaction: the geographical scope of the takeover (domestic versus cross-border M&As), the 
form of and the attitude towards the bid (opposed bids, unopposed tender offers, friendly M&As), 
the success or failure of the negotiations (successfully completed or withdrawn bid), the legal status 
of  the  target  firm  (listed  versus  privately-held),  the  industry  scope  of  the  deal  (focus  versus 
diversification), the means of payment (all-cash, all-equity, mixed offer), and the sub-period of the 
takeover wave in which the bid was announced (the run-up, the peak and the decline of the wave). 
The market combines these pieces of information into a signal about the quality of the bidding and 
                                                 
3 For an overview of the evidence on the wealth effects of M&A activity and the motives for takeovers, see Jensen and 




target firms and of the potential value creation. The share prices are then adjusted accordingly. Table 
1  summarizes  the  theoretical  predictions  and  empirical  evidence  on  the  relationship  between 
takeover characteristics and the market reaction to takeover announcements.   
 
2.2 CE versus UK corporate takeovers: potential differences  
There are fundamental differences between the Anglo-American takeover markets, and that 
in Continental Europe: the typical CE firm has a more concentrated ownership structures (Faccio and 
Lang 2002), operates in an environment with weaker investor protection, and with less developed 
capital  markets  (LaPorta  et  al.  1998),  and  is  subject  to  less  strict  insider  trading  regulations 
(Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2004).  
These differences may affect corporate takeovers in several ways. First, CE biding firms may 
adopt opportunistic takeover strategies such as partial acquisitions and acquisitions with undisclosed 
terms  of  transaction,  which  are  prevented  by  law  in  the  UK.  Second,  the  market  may  regard 
takeovers by CE firms with large blockholders negatively, as these deals may result in expropriation 
of the bidder’s minority shareholder rights. Such expropriation is facilitated in corporate governance 
regimes  with  weak  legal  minority  protection.
4  Third,  a  lack  of  efficient  takeover  regulation  in 
Continental Europe makes target shareholders less powerful relative to the bidder, which allows the 
bidder to capture a larger part of takeover gains. Fourth, CE executive directors/investors who are 
informed about a forthcoming takeover may turn to illegal trading on inside information, whereas 
such  behaviour  is  more  effectively  prevented  in  the  UK.  Below  we  discuss  how  these  specific 
aspects  of  the  CE  market  for  corporate  control  may  affect  the  bidder  and  target’s  share  price 
reactions to takeover announcements  
 
2.2.1. Opportunistic takeover strategies 
Weak investor protection may enable acquirers to adopt takeover strategies that allow them 
to act opportunistically towards the target’s incumbent shareholders (Bertrand et al., 2002). Partial 
acquisitions may turn the target’s incumbent shareholders into minority shareholders, whose rights 
could be expropriated by the acquirer due to poor legal protection. That is, when the protection of 
minority shareholders is not addressed at the regulatory level, bidders may be tempted to use partial 
                                                 
4 Weak investor protection may also have a direct impact on the market valuation of takeover benefits. Bris and Cabolis 
(2005) document that the regulatory environment in both the bidding and target firms’ countries have significant impact 
on premiums paid in M&As. The relationship between the level of investor protection and premiums paid in M&As is 
relatively complex and its analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper. We leave a detailed analysis of this relationship 
to a separate paper.       6
acquisitions to extract private benefits of control at the detriment of the target’s shareholders. To 
protect the target shareholders from being expropriated by the bidder, regulators typically introduce 
a mandatory bid rule (Goergen et al., 2005). The rule obliges bidders acquiring a controlling share 
block to make an offer for all the remaining shares outstanding at a fair price.
5 For instance, partial 
acquisitions of majority control are virtually impossible. However, the number of partial acquisitions 
may  be  high  in countries where  the  mandatory  bid  rule  is  not  enforced (such as  Germany  and 
Sweden). In these countries, we expect target shareholders to dislike partial acquisitions and react 
negatively to their announcements.  
Acquisitions  with  undisclosed  terms  of  transaction  (such  as  means  of  payment  and 
transaction value) are another strategy that enables bidding firms to behave opportunistically. When 
disclosure requirements are low, the management or the controlling shareholder of the bidding firm 
may  conceal  the  details  of  the  bid.  When  a  takeover  with  undisclosed  terms  of  transaction  is 
announced, we expect investors to be aware of potential expropriation and react negatively.  
 
2.2.2. The role of bidder’s large blockholders in takeovers 
The presence of a large shareholder in bidding firms may have a significant impact on the 
market reaction to takeover announcements. However, this impact may differ between countries (it 
may be positive for UK firms and negative for CE firms), as the market views the roles of the major 
shareholders  in  the  two  corporate  governance  regimes  as  being  different.  When  ownership  and 
control  are  dispersed,  small  shareholders  cannot  effectively  monitor  management  and  mitigate 
potential conflicts of interest between management and shareholders due to coordination problems. 
Ownership  concentration resolves this problem,  as  major  shareholders  have  strong  incentives  to 
monitor management and replace it in poorly performing companies (Franks at al., 2001). Therefore, 
investors may regard the presence of a large blockholder in a UK bidding company as a credible 
signal that the takeover decision is driven by motives of profit maximization. 
However, the gains from having the firm’s management monitored by a large blockholders 
may be wiped out by the agency costs associated with opportunistic behaviour of the blockholder 
towards minority shareholders. In takeover context, the costs arise when major blockholders use 
acquisitions as an instrument to transfer wealth from minority shareholders to themselves (Faccio 
and Stolin, 2004). This type of acquisitions is more likely to be observed in CE countries, where 
                                                 
5 The definitions of a controlling share block and fair price vary across countries. UK takeover regulation imposes a 
mandatory bid to be made when the bidder acquires 30% of the target firm’s equity and the fair price to be equal to the 




concentrated  corporate  ownership  structures  prevail  but  the  rights  of  minority  shareholders  are 
relatively less protected. Since minority shareholders are likely to fear potential expropriation, we 
expect the market to react negatively to the announcements of takeovers by CE bidders controlled by 
a major shareholder.   
 
2.2.3. Takeover regulation 
Takeover regulation plays a crucial role in shaping the pattern of M&A activity. Importantly, 
it affects the distribution of the bargaining power and thereby of the takeover surplus between the 
bidder and the target. Regulatory provisions that make target shareholders more powerful relative to 
the  bidder  (such  as  the  mandatory  bid  rule,  the  sell-out  right,  and  takeover  defence  measures) 
redistribute the takeover surplus from the bidder to the target shareholders (Goergen et al., 2005). 
However, in countries lacking this type of regulation, most of the takeover surplus is captured by 
bidding  firms  leaving  the  target’s  shareholders  with  lower  returns.  Similarly,  Rossi  and  Volpin 
(2004) report that targets earn higher premiums in countries where the mandatory bid requirement is 
enforced by law. Goergen et al. (2005) advocate that the UK has adopted a more strict takeover 
legislation  than  CE  countries.  Therefore,  we  expect  higher  takeover  premiums  to  be  offered  in 
takeover bids made to British companies.  
 
2.2.4. Insider trading 
When insider trading is not effectively regulated, insiders are more likely to trade on non-
public information (Bris, 2005). This implies that part of the valuation effect of takeovers is already 
incorporated in the share price prior to the announcement day (Bhattacharya et al., 2000). In this 
case, the takeover valuation effect is likely to be captured in the share price run-up realised prior to 
the bid. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2004) document that among European countries the UK has the 
toughest insider trading law. These are then CE countries where takeovers are preceded by illegal 
trading on inside information.
6                     
 
3.  Data sources, descriptive statistics and methodology 
 
 
                                                 
6 However, Bris (2005) shows that insider trading laws make profitable to violate them, and hence countries with the 
toughest regulation may face bouts of illegal activity.   8
3.1 Sample selection 
We select our original sample of European acquisitions undertaken during the fifth takeover 
wave (1993-2001) from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the Securities Data Company 
(SDC). The SDC data were filtered down to intra-European domestic and cross-border takeovers, 
whereby both the acquirer and the target are from countries within Continental Europe and the UK. 
Our sample also includes deals involving firms from Central and Eastern Europe. We retain only 
those  M&As  that  satisfy  the  following  requirements:  (i)  the  transaction  involves  a  change  in 
control
7; (ii) either the bidder or target shares (or both) are traded on a European stock exchange; 
(iii) both parties in the transaction are independent corporations;
8 (iv) neither the bidder nor the target is a 
financial institution (bank, unit trust, mutual fund or pension fund); (v) the period between two 
consecutive bids by the same acquirer is not less 300 trading days;
9 (vi) financial and accounting 
data for at least one of the participants of the transaction are available in DataStream or in the 
Amadeus, Fame or Reach databases of Bureau van Dijk. 
The quality of the SDC data is verified by comparing its information on the announcement 
date, the companies’ countries of origin, the transaction value, payment structure, share of control 
acquired, bid completion status, and the target’s attitude towards the bid with information from the 
news announcements stored in LexisNexis, the Financial Times, and Factiva.
10 We find that the SDC 
records for M&As from our sample frequently do not coincide with those of the other sources. These 
inconsistencies have been amended by replacing contradictory SDC information with the new one 
extracted from the news announcements. All in all, amendments were made in about 36% of our 
final sample.
11   
The ownership and control structure of the bidding and target firms prior to the takeover 
announcement is collected from a variety of sources described in Appendix II. To control for dual 
class  shares,  pyramidal  ownership  structures,  multiple  control  chains,  and  cross-holdings,  all  of 
which prevail in CE companies, we focus on corporate control structures rather than ownership 
                                                 
7 We require either that the transaction leads to a combination of the firms or that the acquirer who held less than 50% of 
the target’s stock prior to the transaction acquires full control (increases its ownership position to more than 50%). 
8 Divestitures and management buyouts are not included. 
9 The reason is that we want to avoid contamination of the windows used to estimate systematic risk. Therefore, we 
exclude  bids  by  the  same  acquirer  within  less  than  300  trading  days  from  the  previous  announcement  (240  days 
estimation period ending 60 days before the event).  
10  We  consider  all  news  announcements  available  in  English,  French,  German,  Dutch,  Italian,  Spanish,  Swedish, 
Portuguese, Russian, Czech, and Polish languages. For the French, German, Italian, Spanish, Swedish, and Portuguese, 
we use WorldLingo online translator (www.worldlingo.com).  
11 The percentage refers to all M&As from our sample for which at least one deal characteristic reported in SDC does not 
coincide with that from the other sources and hence it was replaced. Most of the inconsistencies found in the SDC 




structures. To identify the ultimate control structure of a firm, we follow the methodology presented 
in Barca and Becht (2001) and Faccio and Lang (2002).  First, we consider only shares bearing 
voting rights. Second, as control depends on both direct and indirect ownership of voting equity, we 
accumulate  the  voting  stakes  directly  or  indirectly  controlled  by  the  same  ultimate  shareholder. 
When a target company is private, we assume that ownership and control concentration in this firm 
amounts to 100%. 
 
3.2 Sample summary statistics 
Our final sample of European M&A announcements consists of 2,419 deals involving firms 
from 28 European countries. The sample characteristics are described in tables 2 through 4.  
 
3.2.1. Sample composition by deal characteristics 
According to panel A of table 2, about 70% of the intra-European takeover bids target a 
domestic firm. The relative number of cross-border bids within Europe has been gradually increasing 
over time, starting with 23% in the beginning of the fifth takeover wave and reaching 32% in its end. 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2004) document a similar tendency for US takeovers.  
Takeovers resulting in a full acquisition of the target’s shares comprise 60% of the sample 
over the period 1993-2001. In the remaining deals, the bidder acquires majority control. The fraction 
of acquisitions of partial control has augmented near the end of the takeover wave. One reason is that 
there is a high number of large M&A transactions in 1998-2001, which are relatively more risky for 
the bidding firms and require considerable financial resources. A desire to diversify the risk of these 
mega-deals and limited financing capacity may force bidders not to bid for all the equity of target 
firms.   
Our sample  comprises  162 (7%) opposed (or  hostile) bids, 473 (19%) unopposed tender 
offers  and  1,784  (74%)  friendly  M&As.  We  classify  an  acquisition  as  opposed  if  the  board  of 
directors of the target firm responds negatively to the bidder’s initial offer for whatever reason.
12 
Further, within the unopposed takeovers, we also distinguish between bids conducted in form of a 
public tender offer (unopposed tender offers) and bids conducted in form of a merger or a private 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that a negative response to the bid may result either from the target’s bargaining strategy to extract a 
higher premium (Schwert, 2000), or from the target directors’ viewpoint that the proposed strategic plan underlying 
the acquisition is incompatible with the target firm’s own strategy (Lipton, 1985).   10
purchase of a control block (friendly M&As).
13 Panel A of table 2 shows that the frequency of 
friendly M&As is especially high in the beginning (1993-96) and in the end of the takeover wave 
(2000-01), whereas the frequency of unopposed tender offers in highest in the period of the takeover 
wave peak (1997-99). Opposed takeovers are least frequently observed when the takeover wave 
slows down (2000-01).   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
About  9% of  all  takeovers  in our  sample  ultimately  fail  as  a  consequence of  successful 
opposition to the bid or a collapse of the friendly takeover negotiations. The rest of the sample is 
divided into successfully completed M&As (80%) and pending negotiations in which the bid has 
been announced but has not been completed or withdrawn (11%).
14 In many of the pending bids, the 
bidder announces its intention to acquire control over the target firm, but the acquisition occurs in 
several steps. That is, at the announcement, the bidder  acquires a large stake of, say, 25%  and 
pledges  to  acquire  control  (the  remaining  25-75%)  in  the  near  future.  The  relative  number  of 
withdrawn bids hits the highest levels in the beginning of the fifth takeover wave (1993-95), whereas 
pending acquisitions occur with high frequency in the end of the wave (2000-01).    
Panel A of table 2 also indicates that a large part of takeover bids are made on privately held 
target firms (63%), while the remainder (37%) are bids on publicly owned targets listed on a stock 
exchange. The frequency of M&As involving public targets substantially increases in the second half 
of the takeover wave (1997-01), reaching its peak in 1999 (46% of the deals), when the M&A 
activity was at its strongest.  
Expansion within the same industry seems to be a dominant takeover strategy during the 
1990s. Sixty-four percent of all the M&A announcements refer to bidders and targets operating in 
                                                 
13 An unopposed tender offer is a public offer to the target shareholders asking them to sell their shares for cash and/or 
equity at a pre-specified price or equity exchange ratio, while the board of directors of the target firm does not respond 
negatively to the bid (issue negative comments about the bid). An acquisition is considered to be successful if a 
sufficient number of shares are tendered such that the bidder gains control over the target. A merger refers to the 
consolidation of the assets of two firms, which is approved by both the shareholders of the target and the shareholders 
of the bidding firms. Generally, the majority of 2/3 or more of shareholder votes of each firm is required for the 
merger to succeed (the required percentage may vary across countries). A private purchase of a control block refers to 
all transactions in which the bidder purchases a controlling share block by means other than a tender offer. This 
category usually comprises acquisitions of private targets or direct purchases of a share block from a large shareholder 
of the target firm.  
14 We checked the status of all bids which were labeled as ‘pending’ in the SDC database. We used LexisNexis and 
Factiva and changed the completion status when pending bids were ultimately completed or withdrawn. For a number 




the same sector or related industries
15, while the remainder are diversifying acquisitions. The highest 
percent of focussed acquisitions is observed in 1997-99.  
Of the 1,721 bids where the payment method is disclosed, the majority (54%) are all-cash 
offers. This percentage is lower than the 80% reported for European all-cash M&As in Faccio and 
Masulis (2005). The difference may be driven by the exclusion of divestitures (acquisitions of other 
firms’  subsidiaries)  and  cross-border  acquisitions  of  US  targets,  which  represent  a  substantial 
fraction of Faccio and Masulis’ sample and are mostly pure cash offers. Panel A of table 2 reports 
that, of all the bids involving equity payments, about half are pure equity-exchange offers. The other 
half are mixed offers that consist of 53% cash, 47% stock, and less than 1% of loan notes, on 
average. Our sample also includes 698 bids (29% of the sample) that lack information about the 
method  of  payment  and  transaction  value.  The  highest  proportion  of  M&As  with  undisclosed 
transaction terms is observed in Austria (68% of all bids in the target’s country), Germany (67% of 
all bids in the target’s country), and Switzerland (57% of all bids in the target’s country). None of 
UK target firms is involved in takeovers with undisclosed terms of transaction, as such lack of 
disclosure would violate UK transparency regulation.      
In panel B of table 2, the characteristics of the takeover deals are detailed. We organize this 
information  according  to  the  geographical  origin  of  the  bidding  firm  (UK  versus  Continental 
Europe).  The  average  takeover  deal  is  worth  US$  1,487  million.  This  figure  is  considerably 
influenced by outliers, as the median value of transactions barely exceeds US$ 24 million.
16  The 
average size of CE takeovers exceeds the size of their UK peers more than seven times.  
Interestingly, bidders from the Continent intend to hold only 81% (95% median) of the target 
shares after the bid completion, while UK bidders seek to own 95% (100% median).
17 Bidders’ 
preferences regarding their ultimate ownership in the target firm are affected by takeover regulation. 
For instance, UK Takeover Code obliges bidders to make a mandatory bid to purchase all shares of 
                                                 
15 We define ‘companies in related industries’ as firms of which the primary 2-digit SIC codes coincide. Changing this 
definition to the 3-digit SIC classification, does not materially change the results in the remainder of the paper.  
16 The largest acquisitions by year are: the US$ 1.5 billion bid by Lagardere Group for Matra-Hachette (both are located 
in France); the US$ 2.5 billion bid in 1994 by Enterprise Oil for Lasmo (both are UK firms); the US$ 5.5 billion bid in 
1995 by Granada Group for Forte (both are UK firms); the US$ 30 billion bid in 1996 by Ciba-Geigy for Sandoz (both 
are located in Switzerland); the US$ 3.5 billion bid in 1997 by Rallye for Casino Guichard Perrachon (both are French 
firms); the US$ 35 billion bid in 1998 by Britain’s Zeneca Group for Sweden’s Astra; the US$ 202 billion bid in 1999 
by Vodaphone for Mannesmann; the US$ 14 billion bid in 2000 by Vodafone for Spain’s Airtel; and the US$ 7 billion 
bid in 2001 by Germany’s E.ON (formerly Veba/Viag) for Britain’s Powergen. 
17 We focus on the percentage of the target’s shares that the bidder ex-ante intends to own after the bid and not on the 
percentage that the bidder obtains ex-post because our sample comprises withdrawn and pending acquisitions, in 
which the bidder acquires less than or nothing of what it was intended. We also refer to the percent of target’s shares 
the bidder intends to own after the bid and not on the percent of shares the bidder intends to acquire because some 
firms accumulate a stake in the target firm (toehold) already prior to the bid.         12
the target firm after it has acquired a share block of 30%. However, this type of requirements was 
virtually non-existent in many CE countries (such as Germany and Sweden) during most of the 
1990s.
18 Therefore, compared to their UK peers, bidders from the Continent have more freedom in 
initiating acquisitions of partial control. The impact of takeover regulation on the takeover bids is 
further supported by evidence that the size of the toehold that UK bidders accumulate prior to the bid 
(averaged over the ones who have decided to do so) is about 25% with a median of 29%, just below 
the 30% mandatory bid threshold. The size of the toehold accumulated by CE bidders is somewhat 
higher: 32% (35% median).
19             
 
3.2.2. Sample composition by countries of bidding and target firms 
Table 3 shows that the UK is the dominant market for corporate control in Europe: half of the 
domestic takeover transactions occur in the UK and one fifth of all the bidders in intra-European 
cross-border acquisitions are UK firms. Proportionally, UK firms are targeted less frequently: merely 
12.7% of the European target firms are headquartered in the UK – a percentage similar to that for 
Germany and France. Unsurprisingly, given the dispersed nature of ownership in UK firms, most 
hostile bids are concentrated in this country: 61% of the domestic and 41% of the cross-border 
hostile bids (from the target firms’ perspective) take place in the UK. The second and third largest 
markets for corporate control in Europe are Germany and France; they respectively account for 10% 
and 13% of all domestic bids, and 12% and 15% of all cross-border bids. Not to be underestimated is 
the Scandinavian M&A market, especially in its impact on cross-border takeover activity in Central 
Europe. Relative to the other major economies in Europe, takeover activity in Italy is remarkably 
low. Firms located in the countries that joined the European Union in 2004 are attractive takeover 
targets, being involved in 15% of all cross-border M&As. In contrast, the involvement of such firms 
as bidders in cross-border acquisitions is negligible, as is the domestic takeover market in Central 
Europe.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
3.2.3. Characteristics of the bidding and target firms 
                                                 
18 For a detailed overview of differences in takeover regulations across European countries and see Goergen et al. (2005) 
19 The difference in mean toeholds of UK and CE bidders is statistically significant at the 1% level. Importantly, only 9% 
of British firms actually decide to purchase a toehold. The figure is twice lower than the percent of bidders with a 




The characteristics of the bidding and target firms are reported in Table 4. Relative to target 
firms, bidders in European M&As tend to be larger and to have better growth opportunities (as 
reflected  by  the  market  capitalization  and  the  Q-ratio).  Also,  bidding  firms  are  somewhat  less 
leveraged than targets (21% versus 23%, respectively). Target firms have a higher percentage of 
collateral (38%) than do bidders (31%). Table 4 also shows that the corporate performance (return 
on assets (ROA), and cash flow to sales) and investment activity (capital investments to total assets) 
of targets and bidders are similar.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Some  attributes  are  significantly  different  between  targets  and  bidders  from the  UK  and 
Continental Europe. Table 4 shows that UK firms (both bidders and targets) outperform their CE 
peers  in  terms  of  sales,  growth  opportunities,  and  ROA.  Furthermore,  UK  companies  are  less 
leveraged and have more collateral. These differences are likely to follow from differences in the 
regulatory environment of the UK and Continental Europe. A growing literature advocates that the 
legal system in the UK ensures better investor protection and corporate focus on shareholder value 
than do the corporate governance regimes of CE countries (La Porta et al., 1997). In turn, this may 
result in higher company valuations and growth potential (La Porta et al., 2002; Himmelberg et al., 
2002).  
UK and CE firms differ not only in terms of performance and capital structure, but also in 
terms of ownership and control. On average, the largest blockholder of a CE bidding firm ultimately 
controls 39% of the voting rights, which is significantly higher than the average voting stake (14%) 
held by the dominant shareholder of a UK bidding firm. For CE bidders, we detect at least one 
dominant shareholder with voting power in excess of 20% in more than three quarters of the firms, 
and a blockholder holding a large majority of voting rights (60% and more) in 21% of the firms.
20 In 
contrast,  UK  bidders  are  characterized  by  dispersed  ownership  structures,  as  only  8%  have  a 
shareholder with a significant blockholding of at least 20% of voting rights. The ultimate ownership 
structures of our bidders are similar to those reported for the UK and Continental Europe by Faccio 
and Lang (2002). Given that there is no mandatory ownership disclosure for privately held firms, we 
have to make an assumption that the ownership concentration amounts to 100%. The reason is that 
                                                 
20 When analyzing control structure data we follow Faccio and Lang’s (2002) approach and focus on control thresholds 
of 20% and 60%. This ensures the comparability of our results with the literature on Continental European M&As that 
employs the Faccio and Lang (2002) ownership and control database (see e.g. Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Faccio and 
Stolin, 2006). We consider a firm to be widely held if there is no a shareholder with a stake of 20% or more. When we 
use alternative cut offs (e.g. the 25% threshold, a blocking minority), we do not find different results.    14
many non-listed firms are likely to be controlled by one or a group of large investors. On average, 
we find little difference between the control structures of target and bidder firms by region (the UK 




3.3.1. Abnormal returns and test statistics 
In  order  to  measure  the  short-term  wealth  effects  prior  to,  at  and  after  the  takeover 
announcement, we apply an event study methodology. That is, the short-term shareholder wealth 
effect at the takeover announcement is computed as the sum of daily abnormal returns realized in the 
period starting 60 days prior and ending 60 days subsequent to the event day.
21 We also consider 
alternative event windows within the [-60, +60] interval. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the 
difference  between  realized  and  market  model  benchmark  returns.  The  market  model  uses  the 
MSCI-Europe index and the parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement.
22 To test for significance of the estimated abnormal returns, we use two 
parametric test statistics (the portfolio test and the standardized test) as proposed by Brown and 
Warner (1985) and the non-parametric Corrado test (Corrado, 1989).
23 
 
3.3.2. Correction for potential sample selection bias  
We  recognize  that  the  regression  analysis  of  the  share  price  reaction  to  takeover 
announcements may suffer from a censoring problem. The analyzed sample of successful, pending, 
and withdrawn M&As excludes deals in which bidders initially decided not to bid. Factors such as 
financial constraints, growth opportunities, and share price performance are likely to be important 
determinants of the bidder’s decision (not) to perform a takeover. In other words, we may observe 
fewer takeovers by bidders with low cash holdings, high leverage, small size, underperforming share 
                                                 
21 The event day is either the day of the announcement or the first trading day following the announcement in case the 
announcement is made on a non-trading day. 
22 Our estimates of the abnormal returns are robust with respect to the different choices of the market index (local, 
European-wide, and worldwide index) and the estimation model of the benchmark returns (the estimated beta adjusted 
for mean-reversion (Blume, 1979), and non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979)). Changing the market index or the 
estimation model does not materially change the results in the remainder of the paper.   
23 The portfolio test statistic assumes that the CARs are larger for securities with a higher variance. Hence, equal weights 
are given to the returns of individual securities. The standardized test statistic assumes that the true CARs are constant 
across  securities  and  gives  more  weight  to  the  securities  with  a  lower  variance  of  the  CARs.  For  reasons  of 
conciseness, we only show the non-parametric test statistics; the results of the parametric tests do not change the 




price, or poor growth opportunities, which may bias our test results. To control for this potential 
bias, we employ Heckman’s (1976, 1979) procedure for a sample-selection correction. Applying a 
Probit analysis on the full sample of European firms (and subsamples of CE and UK firms), we 
estimate the probability that a firm will undertake an acquisition. The resulting parameters are used 
to  compute Heckman’s  ￿  for  each  bidding  firm  in  our  sample.  We  include  Heckman’s ￿  as  an 
additional regressor into the regression analysis of the bidder’s CARs. If the null hypothesis that 
Heckman’s ￿ is insignificant cannot be rejected, censoring is not a significant problem in our sample 
and hence does not lead to sample selection biases in our estimation procedure.  
 
4. Market reaction to takeover announcements (Univariate analysis) 
 
In this section, we focus on univariate analyses of bidder and target CAARs realized in intra-
European M&As. We relate the CAARs to the various characteristics of target and bidding firms and 
of the bid itself: these include the location of the target (domestic versus cross-border M&As), the 
type of the takeover (a full takeover versus the acquisition of majority control), the form of and the 
attitude towards the bid (opposed bids, unopposed tender offers, friendly M&As), the success or 
failure of the negotiations (successfully completed, pending, or withdrawn bid), the legal status of 
the  target  firm  (listed  versus  privately-held),  the  business  expansion  strategy  (focus  versus 
diversification), the means of payment (all-cash, all-equity, mixed offer, or undisclosed means of 
payment), and the sub-period of the takeover wave in which the bid was announced (the run-up, the 
peak and the decline of the wave). We also investigate variation in the market reaction to takeover 
announcements across deals that involve firms of different legal origin.  
 
4.1 Market reaction to takeover announcements: total sample 
Table 5 reports that the announcement of a takeover bid accrues positive abnormal returns to 
the bidder shareholders: on the event day, a small average abnormal return of 0.5% is realized on 
average, though it is statistically significant at the 1% level. Over a 10-day window centred around 
the  event  day,  the  average  CAAR  amounts  to  0.8%.  Strikingly,  the  CAARs  of  bidding  firms 
generated over the 3-month period subsequent to the bid are significantly negative (–3%). Figure 1 
illustrates the evolution of the bidder CAARs daily over the [-60, +60] event window. 
In comparison to the bidder CAARs, the price reactions for the target firms are substantial: 
on the event day, an abnormal return of 9% is realized on average (see table 5). The evolution of the   16
target  CAARs  prior  to and after the  event  day  is  reported  in  Figure 2.  We find  that  there  is  a 
significant increase in the target share price in the two months (40 trading days) prior to the initial 
public announcement. On average, investors who own shares in the target firm two months prior to 
the event day and sell their shares at the end of the event day would earn a premium of 21% above 
the expected return. The overall findings suggest that the majority of takeover deals is expected to 
























Figure 1. Bidder CAARs around the M&A announcement  Figure  2.  Target  (and  bidder)  CAARs  around  the  M&A 
announcement 
 
Note: Figures 1 and 2 show the market reaction to the announcement of M&A transactions for bidding and target firms 
as well as the CAARs before and after the event (day 0). The benchmark used in the market model is the MSCI-Europe 
index returns; the model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.2 Market reaction to takeover announcements by deal characteristics 
 
4.2.1. Geographical scope of transaction 
We  have  mentioned  that  70%  of  the  intra-European  M&As  are  domestic  deals.  Table  5 
shows that bidding firms engaging in cross-border bids experience lower announcement effects than 
do those undertaking domestic acquisitions (0.4% versus 0.6%, respectively), and the difference is 
statistically significant. Subsequent to the event day, the negative price correction for bidding firms 




Investors of target companies also favour more domestic acquisitions. The announcement 
effect of domestic and cross-border targets amounts to 10% and 8%, respectively (Table 5). This 
difference is statistically significant. When we add the price run-up (40 trading days prior to the 
event), the difference increases to nearly 3% and remains statistically significant. Outperformance of 
domestic acquisitions relative to their cross-border peers (both in terms of the bidder’ and target’s 
CAARs)  suggests  that  market  anticipates  difficulties  in  managing  the  post-merger  integration 
process between foreign firms and hence discount the expected takeover synergies.  
 
4.2.2. Type of acquisition 
The acquisitions of partial control have received little attention in the existing literature. This 
is because they are virtually non-existent in the US and UK. However, we find that this type of 
takeovers  prevail  in  Continental  Europe.  Table  5  compares  the  announcement  effect  of  partial 
acquisitions  to  that  of  full  acquisitions.  We  find  that  bidding  firm  shareholders  do  not  favour 
majority  (or  partial)  control  acquisitions  (in  contrast  to  the  acquisition  of  full  control).  Table 5 
documents that although the announcement effect of a majority acquisition is significantly positive 
(0.4%), it is somewhat lower than the announcement effect of a full takeover bid (0.6%). Also, an 
acquisition of majority interest is associated with significant negative abnormal returns both before 
and  after  the  transaction  announcement,  whereas  a  full  acquisition  is  preceded  by  a  significant 
increase in the equity value of the bidding firm.  
Target shareholders also dislike acquisitions of partial control. At the announcement day, the 
share price of a target subject to a full acquisition rises by 12%, which is more than five times larger 
than the abnormal return of a target subject to an acquisition of majority control (see Table 5). 
Investors who purchase target shares three months prior to a full takeover bid and sell the shares 
three months after the announcement earn a CAAR of 31%. In contrast, only 14% is acquired over 
the same period when the bid is made in order to obtain majority control only. The lower returns 
associated with bids for majority control may reflect concerns that a control transfer may lead to 
expropriation of the remaining minority shareholders. 
 
4.2.3. Form of and attitude towards the bid 
When we partition all bids into three subsamples based on the attitude and form of the bid: 
opposed (or hostile) bids, unopposed tender offers and friendly negotiated deals, we observe that 
bidder’s shareholders clearly react differently to the announcements of those deals. On the event day,   18
bidder share prices are subject to a negative price corrections in opposed bids and unopposed tender 
offers. The announcement of friendly M&As is greeted favorably by the market, as the abnormal 
returns are significantly positive (0.8%). However, friendly M&As are followed by remarkable share 
price  decline  over  3  months  subsequent  to  the  bid.  It  seems  that  the  market  reactions  at  the 
announcement are overoptimistic and that the bidders’ shareholders have second thoughts about the 
profitability of these transactions. 
Expectedly,  takeover  bids  opposed  by  the  target’s  board  generate  the  highest  abnormal 
returns  (15%)  to  the  target  shareholders  on  the  announcement  day.  The  announcement  returns 
induced by opposed takeover bids are significantly higher than those induced by unopposed tender 
offers (12%) and friendly M&As (3%). Table 5 also unveils that there are large differences in the 
share price run-ups between friendly and hostile takeover bids. A hostile acquisition generates a 
CAAR of more than 30% over a 2-month period preceding and including the announcement day. In 
contrast, the target share prices significantly underperform in friendly M&As relative to opposed 
bids and unopposed tender offers both before and after the announcement. Over the holding period 
of  6  months  centred  around  the  event  day,  friendly  M&As  generate  a  CAAR  of  merely  10%, 
compared with 32% in tender offers and a considerable 44% in hostile bids. 
 
4.2.4. Bid completion status 
We  also  address the  question  as to  whether  the  markets  are  able  to  predict  the  ultimate 
success  or  failure  of  the  M&A  negotiations.  Table  5  reports  that  the  announcement  effect  for 
unsuccessful bidders is negative (-0.6%), but not statistically significant from zero. The total wealth 
effects (over a 6-month time span) of completed, pending, and withdrawn takeovers range between –
6% and –3%, with most losses occurring to bidding firms facing difficulties to complete the takeover 
negotiations (pending deals) or postponing the completion of the bid. 
The event-day effect for target firms is significantly larger (by 1% to 2%) for successful bids 
than for failures and pending deals. However, over the 2-month window prior to and including the 
event day, there is no difference in the CAARs between failed and successful bids (21.8% versus 
21.5%). For the same period, pending acquisitions underperform successful and withdrawn bids by 3 
to 5%.  
 




Table 5 shows that the announcement of a bid for a private firm induces significantly positive 
abnormal returns of 0.8% to the bidder’s shareholders, whereas the announcement of a bid for a 
public firm results in an (insignificantly) negative return of –0.1%. The evidence is similar to that of 
Moeller et al. (2004) and Faccio et al. (2004). However, the post-announcement returns over longer 
time windows decline to almost -3% when the target firm is private and to -1.3% when it is publicly 
listed (both are significant at the 1% level). This evidence suggests that market revise downward 
potential takeover synergies once more information about the true value and growth potential of the 
target firm is revealed.
24  
 
4.2.6. Industry scope 
Table  5  also  compares  the  announcement  period  bidder  firm  CAARs  in  diversifying 
takeovers with those in industry-related (or focus-oriented) deals. Consistent with the conjecture for 
bidding companies that diversification destroys value on average (see table 1), we find that bidding 
firms  have  significantly  higher  short-run  wealth  effects  around  the  announcements  of  business 
expansions  within  their  core  industry  compared  to  the  returns  induced  by  announcements  of 
diversifying acquisitions (0.63% versus 0.36%). Also, it appears that the market anticipates the focus 
strategy of the bidder, because there is a statistically significant run-up in the bidder’s share price 
over the two-month period prior to the event day. While the share price increases by 1.4% preceding 
an intra-industry bid announcement, it declines by the same percentage preceding the announcement 
of a diversifying takeover. 
When  CAARs  for  target  firms  are  considered,  regardless  of  the  length  of  the  window, 
diversifying  takeovers  outperform  deals  with  a  focus  strategy.  Over  the  period  including  the 
announcement day and the price run-up, target shareholders in diversifying takeovers enjoy a CAAR 
of about 24% whereas those in takeovers with a focus strategy earn a CAAR of about 19%. This 
confirms that bidders may overpay for unrelated target firms and engage in more aggressive bidding 
strategies in diversifying takeovers. 
 
4.2.7. Means of payment 
Asymmetric  information  between  the  bidder’s  management  and  outside  investors  may 
influence the choice of the means of payment and the consequent market reaction. A negative price 
                                                 
24 Due to the low disclosure requirements for privately owned companies, reliable information is not available. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the public firms, which are constantly scrutinized by different regulatory bodies, media, and 
the public.    20
correction is expected for all-equity bids and a positive one for all-cash bids (table 1). Table 5 
confirms that bidders’ shareholders perceive offers involving cash payments more favourably (0.6% 
for all-cash and 0.9% for mixed bids) than all-equity offers (for which the abnormal returns are 
insignificantly different from zero). Furthermore, in the period following the bid announcement, the 
bidder  share  prices  generally  decline,  but  decline  substantially  more  in  bids  involving  equity 
payments. The CAARs over a 6-month period in all-cash bids are not significantly different from 
zero (at –0.9%), whereas those in all-equity bids and mixed offers are significantly negative (-2.2% 
and –2.8%, respectively).  
Table 5 shows that the target’s share price reaction is also sensitive to the means of payment 
in a takeover bid. Regardless of the event window, the CAARs of cash offers bids are significantly 
higher than those of all-equity offers (at the 1% significance level). Acquisitions where the payment 
method is undisclosed do not lead to a significant price change at the announcement. The lack of 
information on such bids is even penalized by the market as the share price decreases by 4% over 
three-month period subsequent to the event day. 
 
4.2.8. The sub-periods of the 5
th takeover wave 
Table 5 shows significant differences between the price reactions to bids for the three sub-
periods  of  the  takeover  wave.  The  sum  of  the  price  run-ups  and  the  announcement  effects  for 
takeover  bids  at  the  beginning,  peak  and  decline  of  the  wave  are  0.19%,  1.47%  and  1.12%, 
respectively. However,  when  we  calculate  CAARs  over  somewhat  longer  time  windows (e.g. 6 
months), it seems that bidder shareholders realise that the bids may have been excessive at the peak 
and at the decline over the takeover wave: the CAARs amount to 0.52% in 1993-96, -1.30% in 1997-
99 and –9.87% in 2000-01.
25 It should be noted that the substantial decline subsequent to the M&A 
peak is already corrected for the strong downward equity market movement. From the middle of 
2000, the M&A climate turned bleak and the stock market decline made bidder shareholders very 
pessimistic about future synergistic gains. Thus, our evidence shows that from the perspective of 
bidding firms, sweet M&As turned sour due to such reasons as managerial hubris, self-interest, and 
herding (see table 1). 
Target shareholders gain the most at the peak of the takeover wave. Table 5 shows that, at the 
announcement day, target firms gain an average premium of 8% prior to 1997, 10% in 1997-99, and 
                                                 
25 This result is unlikely to be driven by outliers, as the median value of CARs over window [-60, +60] for takeovers in 




9% in 2000-01. The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. The second stage of the 
takeover wave also stands out in terms of the price run-up for target firms: it amounts to 13% (up 
from 8% observed in 1993-1996). Over longer time windows, for instance over a 6-month window 
symmetrically centred around the event day, the post-1999 bids yield lower CAARs (21%) than do 
those in 1997-1999 (31%) and those before 1997 (25%). 
 
4.3 Market reaction to takeover announcements by the legal origin of bidder and target  
Rossi  and  Volpin  (2004)  show  that  the  legal  environment  and  takeover  regulation  are 
important determinants of the takeover gains. They report that takeover premiums are higher in 
countries with higher shareholder protection and in countries where the mandatory bid requirement 
is enforced by law. To control for the impact of the legal environment on takeover premiums, we 
classify  all  acquisitions  into  five  groups  according  to  the  legal  origin  of  the  bidder  and  target 
countries,  following  La  Porta  et  al.  (1998).  Countries  from  the  former  communist  block  are 
classified according to their (staged) accession to the European Union, as this event has had an 
important impact on their corporate legislation.  
 
4.3.1. Domestic acquisitions 
Table 6 shows that bidder share price reactions to domestic bids vary considerably by legal 
origin of the firm. Bidding firms of common law and German and Scandinavian civil law countries 
earn  significantly  positive  wealth  gains  at  the  announcement.  Conversely,  the  wealth  changes 
incurred by bidders from French civil law countries and the new and prospective EU entrants are 
insignificantly different from zero. Over a 6-month time window symmetrically around the event 
date, the share price movements are either negative (for firms from German civil law countries and 
the new and prospective EU entrants) or statistically insignificant (for firms from UK common law 
and French and Scandinavian civil law countries).  
Table 6 further documents that the legal origin of the target country also has a clear impact 
on target abnormal returns in domestic deals. Target firms from English common law countries 
experience  very  large  wealth  effects  over  all  event  windows.  Importantly,  target  firms  from 
Scandinavian civil law countries where the corporate governance legislation and the institutional 
financial  environment are close to those in the  UK (LaPorta et al., 1998), also exhibit strongly 
positive CAARs (of 21% over the event day and the price run-up period). While target firms from 
the countries that either joined the EU in 2004 or are expected to join in 2007 have the lowest   22
announcement  effect  (–0.5%),  those  from  French  and  German  civil  law  countries  also  earn 
particularly low CAARs of 1.7% and 2.3%, respectively.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.3.2. Cross-border acquisitions 
Turning  to  cross-border  acquisitions  in  table  6,  we  show  that  bidding  firms  of  German, 
Scandinavian, and French legal origins earn higher announcement returns than do firms of English 
legal origin: the announcement effects are 0.5% (average across the three legal origins) and 0.2% 
respectively. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Companies incorporated in 
countries of  Scandinavian legal origin are  expected to benefit from the announcement of cross-
border takeovers most (0.8%).  
The premiums offered in cross-border takeovers are significantly higher for the target firms 
from English common law countries than for those from the civil law countries: 13.8% versus 5.9% 
at the announcement (averaged across other countries). Adding the price run-up to the announcement 
effect, the numbers increase to even 37% and 14%, respectively. Importantly, the corresponding 
effect for targets from the new and prospective EU entrants is insignificantly different from zero. 
Given that the corporate governance regime of the bidding firm is imposed on the target firm (Bris 
and Cabolis, 2004; and Rossi and Volpin, 2004), it is also important to classify the target firm wealth 
effects by the legal origin of the bidder country.
26 We find that the differences in target share price 
reactions  are  now  less  outspoken.  Still,  the  announcement  period  abnormal  returns  remain  the 
highest when the legal origin of the bidder country is English common law.
27   
 
5. Determinants of the market reaction to takeover announcements (Multivariate analysis)  
 
The  results  of  the  univariate  analysis  suggest  that  the  market  reaction  to  takeover 
announcements varies across takeover bids with different characteristics. We now turn to exploring 
which  of  the  effects  documented  in  the  previous  section  dominates  in  a  multivariate  analysis 
framework. In section 2 we conjecture that the characteristics of the takeover bid convey a signal to 
the market about the quality of the bidding and target firms and of the potential value creation in the 
                                                 
26 According to international law, when a foreign firm acquires 100% of a domestic firm, the nationality of the latter 
changes. Hence, the target firm adopts the accounting standards, disclosure practices, and governance structures of the 
acquiring firm. 




takeover. Therefore, the release of information about the takeover induces investors to update their 
expectations  about  the  bidding  and  target  firms’  prospects.  Thus,  we  expect  the  takeover 
characteristics to explain a substantial part of variation in the bidder and target’s share price changes 
in the period around the takeover announcement. As additional proxies for the quality of the bidders 
and  targets  and  potential  takeover  synergies  we  also  consider  the  financial  and  operating 
performance of these firms and their corporate control structures. 
Information about takeovers is incorporated into the share prices in three steps. First, some 
investors or insiders trade on private information or rumours. Second, the major flow of reliable 
information is released to the market at the first public announcement of the takeover deal. At the 
announcement  day,  investors  learn  about  the  objective  of  the  bidding  firm,  the  target’s  attitude 
towards the bid, and the initial terms of the deal. Third, additional information about the takeover is 
obtained in the post-announcement period. This typically regards the failure or a success of the bid, a 
better estimate of the synergy values, and the ultimate terms of the transaction. Since the information 
revealed at each step is likely to affect market expectations about the bidder and target’s prospects, 
we model market reaction to takeover announcements consisting of three components: the pre-event, 
announcement, and the after-event effects. In separate regressions, we investigate the factors that 
affect the CARs realized prior to the bid over the period [-60, -2] days, over the 3 days around the 
bid announcement, and subsequent to the bid over the period [+2, +60] days. Given that we expect to 
observe fundamental differences between M&As involving UK and CE firms (see section 2), we 
also run the regressions for these two types of deals separately.  
 
5.1. Bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns 
  The determinants of the market reaction to takeover announcements for bidding firms are 
reported in table 7 and their economic effects are in table 8. The analysis of bidder returns may be 
subject to a sample selection bias, as bidders may already have specific characteristics (independent 
of the takeover decision) that generate a specific level of returns. To control for this potential bias, 
we apply Heckman’s procedure for sample-selection correction (see section 3.3.2).
28  
 
5.1.1.  Bidder pre-announcement returns 
                                                 
28 The fourth row from the bottom of table 7 indicates regressions for which censoring is found to be a significant 
problem and the correction for the sample selection bias is applied. The correction is needed for the pre-bid CARs in the 
sub-sample of CE bids.   24
The pre-announcement returns on the shares of a bidding firm over the period starting 3 
months and ending 2 days before the event are positively influenced by the bidder’s Tobin’s Q (see 
model  1  in  tables  7  and  8).  An  increase  in  the  Q-ratio  by  one  standard  deviation  leads  to  an 
incremental rise in the bidder’s run-up premium of 1023 basis points (see table 8). This suggests that 
investors value corporate takeovers more when the bidding firm has better growth opportunities. In 
contrast, investors are wary when a bidding firm with high cash flow reserves makes a takeover bid. 
In such cases, legitimate doubts arise about the true motives for the takeover: cash surpluses are 
likely  to  be  used  for  managerial  empire  building  (Jensen,  1986).  Accordingly,  a  one  standard 
deviation increase in the bidder’s cash flows reduces the run-up effect by 1666 basis points. 
Since hostile takeovers are often launched after unsuccessful private negotiations with the 
target management, these deals are likely to be anticipated by the market due to information leakages 
or  insider  trading.  We  confirm  that  this  is  the  case:  the  pre-announcement  CAARs  in  hostile 
takeovers are substantially higher than those in unopposed bids (the difference amounts to 320 basis 
points). The fact that takeovers are preceded by a substantial positive increase in the share price of 
bidding  firms  also  suggests  that  these  deals  are  expected  to  create  value.  However,  the 
announcement effect itself triggers a negative reaction in bidder share prices (see Section 5.2.1). At 
this  point,  bidder  shareholders  may  fear  the  emergence  of  a  bidding  war  which  may  erode  the 
potential synergistic value.   
While the above findings are valid for both UK and CE bidders, the decomposition of the 
sample based on the location of the bidding firms reveals some differences (see models 2 and 3). 
Diversifying  takeover  bids  are  associated  with  a  decrease  in  the  pre-announcement  CARs  for 
bidding firms. However, this result is largely driven by CE bidders. For these firms, the run-up 
premium in diversifying takeovers is 347 basis points lower than in industry-related deals. The pre-
announcement change in the share price of CE bidding firms also incorporates the negative effect of 
a forthcoming takeover with undisclosed terms of transaction (-327 basis points). Also, CE investors 
favour acquisitions of targets with high collateral. An acquisition of a target with high collateral may 
increase the European bidder’s capacity to issue new debt at favorable terms (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998). A one standard deviation increase in the target firm’s collateral leads to a 522 basis point 
increase in the run-up premium of Continental bidders.  
For the UK sub-sample, the returns over the pre-announcement period are 366 basis points 




a temporary overvaluation of their equity and use it as cheap currency for acquiring real assets.
29 As 
the takeover wave progresses, it seems that there are more information leakages prior to the public 
announcements of UK bids, or that takeovers in the UK are more predictable. M&As undertaken in 
the late 1990s are associated with significantly higher share price run-ups than those made in 1993-
96.  
The presence of a large shareholder in bidding firms also has a significant impact on the 
bidder abnormal returns. However, this impact is positive for UK firms and negative for CE firms. 
The  presence  of  a  blockholder  with  a  control  stake  of  at  least  20%  leads  to  a  rise  in  the  pre-
announcement CARs of UK bidders by 351 basis points but to a reduction in the CARs of CE 
bidders  by  237  basis  points.  This  result  confirms  that  the  market  views  the  roles  of  the  major 
shareholders  in  UK  and  CE  firms  as  being  different.  Investors  regard  the  presence  of  a  large 
blockholder in a UK company as a credible signal that the takeover decision is driven by motives of 
profit maximization, while minority shareholders of the CE bidders with a controlling shareholder 
fear expropriation.  
[Insert about here Tables 7 and 8] 
 
5.1.2.  The bidder’s announcement effect 
On the announcement day, when information about the takeover bid is made public, investors 
assess (or adjust their assessment of) the potential takeover synergies and re-consider their valuation 
of the bidding and target firms. Model 4 in table 7 shows that the announcement of a hostile takeover 
or of a tender offer triggers a significant negative price correction for bidding firms. The correction 
amounts to reductions of 192 and 164 basis points in the announcement returns for hostile bids and 
tender offers, respectively (see table 8). This result is due to shareholder concerns that their firm will 
offer too high a premium. An all-equity offer also forces investors to adjust the bidder’s share price 
downward. Announcement CARs in all-equity deals are 89 basis points lower than the CARs in 
deals that involve cash payments. One dominant explanation is that an equity payment conveys the 
                                                 
29 If the managers of a bidding firm know that the firm’s shares are worth more than their current market price, they will 
prefer  to  pay  for  the  acquisition  with  cash.  Conversely,  if  the  bidder’s  management  believes  that  the  shares  are 
overvalued, they prefer to offer equity. Also, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan (2003) 
argue that overvalued bidders use equity to buy real assets of undervalued (or less overvalued) targets to take advantage 
of  the  mispricing  premium  over  the  longer  term  when  the  overvaluation  may  be  corrected.  In  both  cases,  strong 
performance of the bidder’s share price is an important determinant of the bidder’s decision to use equity as a means of 
payment.   26
signal that  the  bidder’s  share  price  is  overvalued,  which  in  turn triggers  an adverse  revaluation 
effect.  
A significant positive announcement effect on returns to the bidding firms is observed in 
takeover bids for private targets (78 basis points). The literature formulates several explanations for 
this phenomenon (see e.g. Faccio et al., 2005). First, illiquid (privately-held) shares are likely to be 
sold at a discount. Second, private negotiations with the controlling shareholder of an unlisted firm 
are likely to result in lower costs of transferring control compared to open market purchases from 
dispersed shareholders (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997). Third, an all-equity offer to a private 
firm may create an outside blockholder in the bidding firm and hence bring about more managerial 
discipline (Chang, 1998).  
Acquisitions  of  full  control  (100%  of  the  equity)  are  also  associated  with  higher  bidder 
announcement returns than are acquisitions of majority control; the difference amounts to 138 basis 
points. Takeover deals with undisclosed terms are an important concern for the investors of CE 
bidding firms: concealed information about the transaction value and the means of payment costs 
bidding firms 90 basis points in the announcement premium (see models 5 and 6). Investors are wary 
that the terms of the deal are not disclosed when it is aimed at expropriating their rights either by 
management or by the controlling shareholder.  
A negative price correction for CE bidders also takes place when a relatively large target is 
approached. A one standard deviation increase in the relative size of the transaction reduces the 
bidder’s announcement effect by 108 basis points. Two explanations are possible. First, this negative 
price  correction  expresses  the  information  asymmetries  between  bidding  and  target  firms. 
Uncertainty about the true market value of the target firm reflects the possibility that the bidder may 
incur substantial losses in case of a post-acquisition adverse revaluation of the target’s assets. The 
magnitude  of  these  potential  revaluation  losses  depends  on  the  relative  size  of  the  target  firm. 
Second,  as  larger  firms  generally  require  a  more  complex  management  structure  to  operate 
effectively, the post-acquisition integration may be a relatively more difficult process. Investors fear 
that their firm will bear additional costs associated with these difficulties and adjust the firm’s value 
downward.  
UK investors seem to dislike acquisitions by bidding firms holding excessive cash reserves 
(see model 5). A one standard deviation increase in the bidder’s cash flow is associated with a 
reduction in the announcement CARs by 468 basis points. Investors fear that high free cash flow 




activity  was  slowing  down  in  2000-2001,  UK  deals  were  associated  with  significantly  lower 
announcement returns than similar bids in the earlier periods (the difference is 152 basis points). 
This may reflect that investors get wary when the investment climate deteriorates and the stock 
market declines. In such periods, the market (belatedly) starts realizing that there is a danger of 
overpaying due to managerial hubris and self-interest.   
 
5.1.3.  Bidder post-announcement returns 
Bidding firm CARs realized over the three months subsequent to the event day exhibit a 
persistently  declining  trend.  Our  analysis  reveals  that  M&As  initiated  in  the  late  1990s  trigger 
significant  negative  returns  subsequent  to  the  event  day.  In  these  deals,  the  post-announcement 
bidder  CARs  are  reduced  by  1082  basis  points  (see  model  7  in  tables  7  and  8).  The  negative 
coefficient  on  the  bidder’s  Q-ratio  reflects  the  market’s  reassessment  of  ‘glamour’  firms.  As 
suggested by Rau and Vermaelen (1998), glamour firms tend to overestimate their ability to create 
synergies  in  takeovers,  and  are  more  likely  to  overpay  than  are  value  firms.  When  these 
circumstances of the bid become clear, the market reassesses the quality of the bidder and adjusts the 
share price accordingly. A one standard deviation increase in the bidder’s Q-ratio reduces the post-
announcement returns by 1023 basis points.  
There is evidence that the announcement and post-announcement valuation effects increase 
with the bidder’s share price performance prior to the takeover bid.
30 The evidence is consistent with 
a behavioural finance point of view: the positive relation between run-up and mark-up premiums 
may result from the fact that investors tend to overestimate the potential gains in takeovers launched 
by outperforming bidders.  
Withdrawn takeover bids seem to be disliked by the market.  However, this effect occurs 
only with respect to UK bidders (see models 8 and 9). Failure to complete a takeover deal costs UK 
bidding  firms  867  basis  points  of  their  post-announcement  returns.  CE  investors  revise  their 
expectations about takeover gains upwards if the bidder has accumulated a toehold in the target firm 
prior to the bid. A one standard deviation increase in the toehold leads to an increase of 205 basis 
points  in  the  post-announcement  CARs.  Apart  from  the  difference  in  the  reaction  to  the 
announcement of a withdrawn bid and the effect of a toehold, the patterns of post-announcement 
share price changes in UK and CE bidders are very similar.  
                                                 
30 Although this relationship has significant predictive power for the bidder CARs, the economic significance is small. A 
100-basis points increase in the bidder CARs prior to the bid leads to an increase in the announcement and post-
announcement premiums of merely 7 and 6 basis points, respectively.   28
 
5.2. Targets’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Table  9  exhibits  the  determinants  of  target  firm  share  price  changes  around  takeover 
announcements. The economic effect of the estimated parameters is reported in table 10. 
 
5.2.1.  Targets’ pre-announcement returns 
   Over the three months prior to hostile bid announcements, target shareholders can pocket 
significantly  higher  cumulative  abnormal  returns  than  they  can  prior  to  friendly  M&As.  The 
anticipation of a hostile takeover is associated with a 923 basis point increase in the target’s pre-
announcement returns (model 1 in tables 9 and 10). This confirms that hostile bids are more likely to 
be anticipated, or that some degree of insider trading or trading on rumours takes place. Also, firms 
that were targeted during the peak period of the fifth takeover wave (1997-99) experienced a very 
substantial  pre-announcement  share  price  increase  compared  to  the  companies  targeted  at  the 
beginning (1993-1996) and at the end (2000-2001) of the wave (the difference is 832 basis points). It 
seems that paying too high a price for a target firm is more likely to occur when takeover activity is 
at its peak because the bids become more aggressive and are more likely to trigger opposition by the 
target firm. UK targets experience significantly higher share price run-ups than do other targets in 
our sample: the difference amounts to 1106 basis points. 
Partitioning our sample into UK and CE targets, we find that the significant premiums paid 
for UK targets are mainly driven by cross-border acquisitions (see models 2 and 3). The anticipation 
of a cross-border acquisition leads to an additional run-up premium of 1327 basis points for UK 
targets. This stands in sharp contrast with the statistically insignificant reduction in the run-up of CE 
targets by 169 basis points. For CE targets, pre-announcement CARs increase with collateral: a one 
standard  deviation  increase  in  the  collateral  leads  to  an  845  basis  point  increase  in  returns. 
Diversification also triggers significant anticipations of wealth increases for CE targets. For those 
companies,  an  incremental  premium  of  595  basis  points  is  realized.  Investors  expect  bidders 
pursuing diversification strategies to bid more aggressively and hence pay higher takeover premiums 
than do bidders adhering to a focus strategy.  
 






5.2.2.  Target announcement returns  
In addition to a considerable share price run-up, target shareholders can make substantial 
gains upon the actual announcement of a hostile bid (model 4 in table 10). The difference in the 
returns of hostile and unopposed bids amounts to 741 basis points. The announcement of a tender 
offer is another important factor increasing the value of the target firm (447 basis points). Both 
results are in line with the hold-out argument: the bidder needs to pay a higher premium to induce 
small  target’s  shareholders  to  sell  their  shares.  As  such,  the  more  diffuse  the  target’s  control 
structure the higher is the premium paid. This conjecture may also explain the substantially larger 
wealth effects of hostile bids and tender offers for UK relative to CE targets (see models 5 and 6). 
One reason is that dispersed ownership structures prevail in the UK but not in Continental Europe. 
The difference between the announcement effects for UK and CE targets is further confirmed by the 
significant  positive  coefficient  of  the  English  legal  origin  indicator  variable  (model  4).  Target 
companies  from  English  common  law  countries  accumulate  markedly  higher  announcement 
premiums than do firms from civil law countries (the difference amounts to 537 basis points). 
The announcement premium accrued to target shareholders is 273 basis points higher at the 
peak than at the beginning and the end of the takeover wave. Higher premiums (by 268 basis points) 
are also observed in cross-border acquisitions. When the terms of the deal remain undisclosed or 
when the offer involves an equity exchange, the bidder’s share price declines by 619 and 651 basis 
points, respectively.    
There is a significant positive relation between the share price run-up and announcement 
returns of CE target firms. A run-up premium of 100 basis points leads to an additional return of 16 
basis points at the bid announcement (model 6). This result stands in sharp contrast to Schwert 
(1996) who does not find such a relation for the US. Remarkably, Table 9 does not report such a 
relation for UK target firms either (model 5). The significant relation between mark-up and run-up 
premiums for CE targets suggests that the share price run-up, frequently caused by insider trading 
(Schwert, 1996; Meulbroek, 1992), is harmful to bidding firms as it significantly raises the price paid 
to acquire control.  
 Another feature of M&As involving CE targets is the negative relation between the bidder’s 
toehold and the announcement premium accrued to target shareholders. A one standard deviation 
increase in the bidder’s pre-bid ownership of target shares leads to a 395 basis point reduction in the 
target announcement returns. Betton and Eckbo (2000) report similar evidence for US firms. They 
explain that a larger toehold implies a higher probability of the relatively low target payoff in the   30
single-bid successful outcome.
31 The relation between the toehold and the announcement effect is 
insignificant however for UK firms.
32 
We also observe that the shareholders of CE targets are the  main winners in diversified 
takeovers. Diversifying bids are associated with a premium which is 512 basis points higher than 
that in focus-oriented deals. When a UK company is acquired, the relative size of the transaction 
matters: a one standard deviation increase in the relative size leads to a reduction of 192 basis points 
in  the  target’s  announcement premium.  Withdrawn  takeover  bids  lead  to  significant  share price 
increases (883 basis points) for the UK target firms. This increase itself may be one of the reasons a 
bid ultimately fails, as a bidder is likely to withdraw its bid if target shareholders demand too high a 
premium.  
 
5.2.3.  Target post-announcement returns 
The models explaining the post-announcement returns accrued to target shareholders have 
low explanatory power because these share prices remain relatively unchanged. As model 7 in table 
10 shows, the target abnormal returns decrease by 961 basis points when the takeover terms are not 
disclosed, and by 1287 basis points when the bidder faces difficulties in completing the transaction. 
In contrast, the CARs increase after the announcement of a full acquisition (by 541 basis points). As 
in the case of the announcement CARs, the share price run-up positively affects post-bid target 
returns.  This  indicates  that  these  are  additional  costs  to  the  bidding  firm  triggered  by  pre-
announcement leakages of information. However, the negative coefficient on the toehold variable 
indicates that bidding firms pay a lower total price when they acquire a toehold in the target firm 
prior to the bid. Takeover bids made in the period of the peak and decline of the takeover wave are 
associated with a significantly negative post-announcement stock price revaluation (by 321 and 688 
basis points, respectively). However, all the effects mentioned in this subsection are only significant 
for CE target companies (model 9). In the UK, the post-announcement CARs of target firms are 
positively influenced by a withdrawal of the bid (model 8). It seems that investors are relieved that 
the bid is withdrawn and that they anticipate other, more profitable bids.   
The only common effect for both UK and CE targets is the positive relation between the 
targets’ post-bid returns and cash flows (see models 8 and 9). A one standard deviation increase in a 
                                                 
31 A larger toehold reduces the overall takeover price a bidder will have to pay (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986).   
32 The lack of significance may be explained by the fact that only 9% of the UK bidders actually acquire a toehold in the 




target firm’s cash flow triggers an increase in the post-announcement premium of 389 basis points. 
On the one hand, this suggests that negotiations between target shareholders and the bidder are on-
going and that a cash-rich target has better opportunities to negotiate a higher premium. On the other 
hand, this result is also in line with the conjecture that a cash-rich target is more able to apply anti-
takeover  measures  such  as  share  buy-backs  or  an  increase  in  dividend  payout,  which  make  its 
acquisition more costly for the bidder. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
This paper has examined the determinants of the market reaction to the announcements of 
European corporate takeovers that took place during the period 1993-2001, the fifth takeover wave. 
We document that the majority of takeover deals is expected to generate synergy values: they trigger 
substantial share price increases at the announcement, most of which are captured by the target firm 
shareholders.  We  find  large  announcement  effects  (of  9%)  for  the  target  firms  compared  to  a 
(statistically significant) announcement effect of merely 0.5% for the bidding firms. Analysis of pre-
bid cumulative abnormal returns reveals that bidder and target price reactions are not limited to the 
announcement  day  but  commence  already  more  than  two  months  prior  to  the  initial  public 
announcement. Including the price run-up, the cumulative abnormal returns increase to 21% for the 
targets and 0.9% for the bidders. Subsequent to the event day, negative revaluations of the bidder 
and target’s share prices occur.   
We show that there is systematic variation in the valuation effects of takeovers with different 
characteristics,  and these findings are valid for both UK  and Continental European firms.  First, 
hostile  takeovers  and  tender  offers  trigger  substantially  larger  price  reactions  to  the  target 
shareholders  than  do  friendly  M&As.  Second,  investors  adjust  downwards  both  the  bidder  and 
target’s share prices at the announcement of all-equity offers. Third, target shareholders gain higher 
premiums in cross-border takeovers. Fourth, an acquisition of a private firm triggers significantly 
positive abnormal returns to the bidder’s shareholders. We also demonstrate that takeovers occurring 
when takeover activity is slowing down trigger lower gains to both bidder and target shareholders 
than do deals at the beginning of the wave.  
We also detect some fundamental differences between takeovers in the UK and Continental 
Europe. First, the shareholders of UK target firms are able to pocket significantly higher returns than 
their Continental European peers. We relate this difference in premiums to a more strict takeover   32
legislation in the UK than in the Continental European  countries,  which protects the UK target 
shareholders from expropriation by the bidder and gives these target shareholders more power to 
extract higher premiums in takeover negotiations.   
Second, the presence of a large shareholder in the bidding firm has a significantly positive 
impact in the UK and a negative one in Continental Europe. This evidence suggests that investors 
view the roles of the major shareholders in UK and Continental European firms as fundamentally 
different. The presence of a large blockholder in a UK bidder company is regarded as a credible 
signal  that  the  takeover  decision  is  driven  by  motives  of  profit  maximization.  In  contrast,  the 
presence of a controlling shareholder in a Continental European firm may be interpreted as a signal 
that the takeover may also expropriate the firm’s minority shareholders. The lack of an efficient 
takeover regulation and weak protection of shareholders in Continental Europe is likely to account 
for this difference.  
Third,  there  is  evidence  of  a  significantly  positive  relation  between  mark-up  and  run-up 
premiums to bidder and target firms from Continental Europe. This finding stands in sharp contrast 
to Schwert (1996) who does not find such a relation for the US. Our analysis shows that the UK 
market exhibits no such a relation either. The run-up premium is typically caused by insider trading, 
which  is  less  regulated  in  Continental  Europe  than  in  the  UK.  Therefore,  the  positive  relation 
between  run-up  and  mark-up  premiums  indicates  that  insider  trading  is  harmful  to  Continental 
European bidding firms, as it significantly raises the price paid to acquire target shares. This in turn, 
may discourage potential bidders from making a takeover bid. 
Finally, the Continental European market is also distinct in that there are a high number of 
takeover bids where the transaction terms remain undisclosed. Such transactions lead to substantial 
losses to the shareholders of both bidding and target firms. Similarly, acquisitions of partial control, 
virtually non-existent in the UK but prevailing in Continental Europe, trigger significantly lower 
share  price  reactions  at  their  announcement.  This  evidence  suggests  that  Continental  European  
regulators who want to facilitate efficient corporate restructuring in their countries need to introduce 
measures  to  prevent  takeovers  leading  to  expropriation  of  the  bidder  and  target’s  (minority) 
shareholders. 
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Appendix I. Data sources of ownership and control. 
 
The ownership and control data that are not available from the sources below are gathered from annual reports and the 
shareholder registers of national stock exchanges.  
 
Country  Data sources 
Austria  Prof. Dr. Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna); Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Belgium  Prof.  Dr.  Christoph  van  der  Elst  (Tilburg  University);  Prof.  Dr.  Luc  Renneboog  (Tilburg 
University) 
Cyprus  Stockwatch Cyprus (http://www.stockwatch.com.cy)  
Czech Rep.  SCP- The Prague Securities Centre (http://www.scp.cz) 
Denmark  Prof. Dr. Steen Thomsen and Mr. Michael Emil Olinger (Copenhagen Business School) 
Estonia  Tallinn Stock Exchange (http://www.ee.omxgroup.com) 
Finland  Prof. Dr. Benjamin Maury (HANKEN Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration) 
France  Prof. Dr. Alain Alcouffe (Toulouse University); Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Germany  Prof.  Dr.  Luc  Renneboog  (Tilburg  University);  Prof.  Dr.  Ekkehart  Boehmer  (Texas  A&M 
University); Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Ireland      Thomson Financial Research: annual reports of individual firms; Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Italy  Prof. Dr. Marcello Bianchi (CONSOB) 
Latvia  Riga Stock Exchange (http://www.rfb.lv); Dr. Anete Pajuste (Riga Business School) 
Lithuania  Vilnius Stock Exchange (http://www.nse.lt) 
Netherlands  Annual reports and the Financieele Dagblad 
Norway  Prof. Dr. Bernt Arne Odegaard (Norwegian School of Management BI) 
Poland  Dr. Grzegorz Trojanowski (University of Exeter) 
Portugal  Prof. Dr. Carlos Ferreira Alves (Porto University); Mr. Pedro Verga Matos (Universidade Técnica 
de Lisboa); CMVM - Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (www.cmvm.pt) 
Romania  Bucharest Stock Exchange (http://www.bvb.ro) 
Slovenia  Dr. Aleksandra Gregoric (Ljubljana University) 
Spain  Prof. Dr. Rafael Crespí (Universitat de les Illes Balears); CNMV- Comisión Nacional del Mercado 
de Valores (http://www.cnmv.es)  
Sweden  Prof. Dr. Martin Holmen (Uppsala University) 
Switzerland  Dr.  Markus  Schmid  (University  of  Basel);  Mr.  Diego  Dimitri  Liechti  (Universität  Bern):  data 
source Swiss Stock Guide (Schweizer Aktienfuehrer) 
UK  Dr. Grzegorz Trojanowski (University of Exeter); Faccio and Lang (2002); Thomson Financial 





Appendix II. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
1997-1999  Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 
1999 (the climax of the 5
th takeover wave); equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
2000-2001  Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 
2001 (the decline of the 5
th takeover wave); equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
All-cash payment  Indicator equals one if the acquisition is fully paid with cash, and equals zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
All-equity payment  Indicator equals one if the acquisition is fully paid with equity, and equals zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Blockh>20%  Indicator equals one if the firm is controlled by a blockholder owning a voting stake of 20% and more 
prior to the takeover. Source: see Appendix II. 
Blockh>60%  Indicator equals one if the firm is controlled by a blockholder owning a voting stake of 60% and more 
prior to the takeover. Source: see Appendix II. 
CFlow/TA  Ratio of total cash flow (including cash flow from operating, financial, and investment activities) to total 
assets,  at  the  year-end  prior  to  the  deal  announcement.  Source:  SDC  and  Amadeus/Fame/Reach  and 
DataStream. 
Collateral  Ratio of tangible assets to total assets; both refer to the year prior to the deal announcement. Source: 
computed based on Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream. 
Control (%)  Ultimate voting stake owned by the bidder’s largest shareholder. Source: see Appendix II.  
Cross-border bid  Indicator equals one if the bidder and target are from different countries, and equals zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC and LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Diversification  Indicator equals one if the bidder and target operate in different industries (their primary 2-digit SIC 
codes do not coincide), and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
English  Indicator equals one if the firm is incorporated in a country of English legal origin (Ireland and the UK), 
and equals zero otherwise. Source: computed based on the LaPorta et al. (1997) classification 
Investments/TA  Ratio of total investments to total assets, both refer to the  year-end prior to  the deal announcement.  
Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Leverage  Ratio of total debt to total assets at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. Source: computed based 
on Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Friendly M&A  Indication equals one if the takeover is not qualified as an opposed (by the target firm) bid or as an 
unopposed  tender  offer  (see  Opposed  bid  and  Tender  offer);  it  is  zero  otherwise.  Source:  SDC, 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
M&A of 100%  When CARs over windows [-60, -2] and [-1, +1] are analyzed, the indicator equals one if the bidder 
intends to hold 100% of the share capital of the target firm after the bid completion, and equals zero 
otherwise. When CARs over window [+2, +60] are analyzed, the indicator equals one if the bidder owns 
100% of share capital of the target firm after the bid completion, and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC, 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Market value  Market capitalization of the bidding firm 60 days prior to the initial bid announcement. Source: Amadeus 
and DataStream 
Opposed (by the 
target’s board) bid 
Indicator equals one if the initial takeover offer meets a negative reaction by the management of the target 
firm or if a competing bid is made. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times  
Pending bid  Indicator equals one if the bid has been announced but has not been completed or withdrawn afterwards. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Private target  Indicator equals one if target firm was a stand-alone firm not listed on any stock exchange at the moment 
of the bid announcement, and is zero otherwise. Source: SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
Q-ratio  Ratio of market value of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus book value of debt over the sum of book 
value  of  equity  and  book  value  of  debt.  The  market  value  of  equity  is  taken  60  days  prior  to  deal 
announcement,  book  value  of  equity  and  debt  are  at  year-end  prior  to  deal  announcement.  Source: 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Relative size  The  ratio  of  transaction  value  over  the  sum  of  the  transaction  value  plus  the  bidder’s  market 
capitalization. If the transaction value is undisclosed, we employ the product of the percentage of share 
capital acquired and the book value of the target firm’s assets one year prior to the bid as a proxy. Source: 
SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times and Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Returns on Assets  Ratio of net income to  total  assets, both refer to  the year-end prior  to deal announcement.  Source: 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream   38
Variable  Definition 
Run-up             Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of bidder/target over the window [-60, -2] preceding the day of the 
deal announcement. The market model is adjusted for thin-trading and reversion to the mean over the 
period of 300 to 60 days  before  M&A announcement; the  market index is  the MSCI Europe index. 
Source: DataStream 
Sales/TA  Ratio of sales revenues to total assets; both refer to the year-end prior to the deal announcement.  Source: 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Tender offer 
(unopposed by the 
target’s board) 
Indicator equals one if the bidder makes a public offer to purchase shares of the target firm and the 
takeover is not classified as opposed (see Opposed bid); and is zero otherwise. Generally, an unopposed 
tender offer is a public offer to the target shareholders asking them to sell their shares for cash and/or 
equity at a pre-specified price or equity exchange ratio, while the board of directors of the target firm does 
not issue negative statements about the bid. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times  
Toehold     Percentage of the target firm shares that the  bidder had accumulated prior to the bid announcement. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Total assets  Total  assets  of  the  firm  at  the  year-end  prior  to  deal  announcement.    Source:  DataStream  and 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
Undisclosed terms  This indicator variable equals one if the terms of the transaction such as the means of payment or the 
transaction value are not disclosed, and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and 
Financial Times 
Withdrawn bid  Indicator equals one if the bid was ultimately unsuccessful, and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC, 






Table 1. Determinants of the anticipated gains to the bidder’s and target’s shareholders 
 
  Empirical evidence  Expected effect on  
Bidder’s CARs 
Expected effect on  
Target’s CARs 
       
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE:       
BIDDER & TARGET: In cross-border acquisitions, bidding and target firms are likely to benefit by taking advantage of 
imperfections in international capital, factor, and product markets (Hymer, 1976); by internalising the R&D capabilities of 
target companies (Eun et al., 1996); and by expanding their businesses into new markets (as a response to globalisation 
trends). 
 






BIDDER & TARGET: Regulatory and cultural differences between the bidder and target countries may lead to difficulties in 
managing the post-merger process and hence failure to achieve merger synergies. Anticipating such difficulties in cross-
border bids, the market may discount the expected takeover gains (Schoenberg, 1999).  







       
TYPE OF ACQUISITION:       
BIDDER: Partial acquisitions are likely to take place when the acquisition is too risky or the bidding firm has insufficient 
financing capacity to acquire 100% of the target equity. Partial acquisitions are also associated with potential conflicts of 
interest that may arise between the bidder and the remaining target shareholders after the acquisition. Hence, the market is 
expected to react less favourably to partial acquisitions than to full acquisitions.   
TARGET: Bidding firms may use partial acquisitions (acquisitions of majority control but not of 100% control) to expropriate 
the target firms’ minority shareholders (Faccio and Stolin, 2004). It follows that such acquisitions may create less value and 
are associated with significantly lower returns to the target shareholders than are acquisitions in which the bidder intends to 
obtain full control (100% of the equity). 
Unknown  (+) M&A of 100%  (+) M&A of 100% 
       
FORM OF AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BID:       
BIDDER: Shareholders of the bidding firms fear that their firm will offer too high a premium if the target’s management 
opposes the bid or if the offer is made directly to the target shareholders (bypassing the board of directors). The anticipated 
upward revisions in the offer premium erode the synergy values accruing to the bidder.  
TARGET: Market expects that opposition against the bid will lead to the upward movement of the target’s share price at the 
announcement of a hostile bid. 
Franks and Mayer 
(1996); Gregory (1997);  
Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) 
(-) Opposed (or 
hostile) bid 
(-) Tender offer 
(+) Opposed (or 
hostile) bid 
(+) Tender offer 
       
BID COMPLETION STATUS:       
BIDDER: If takeovers are positive net present value investments, then unsuccessful bidder returns should reflect the loss of 
profitable investment opportunities (Ruback, 1983) 
TARGET: Withdrawn takeover bids may lead to share price increases for target firms. This increase itself may be one of the 
reasons the bid ultimately fails, as a bidder is likely to withdraw its bid if target shareholders demand too high a premium. 
The post-announcement CARs of target firms may also be positively influenced by the withdrawal of the bid. The reason is 
that investors get relieved that the bid is withdrawn and that they anticipate other, more profitable bids.   
 







TARGET: A bid withdrawal may lead to negative market reactions when investors fear that their firm’s management blocked 
the takeover in order to protect its own interests, which diverge from those of the shareholders (Burkart and Panunzi, 2006).  
 
Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) 
 
  (-) Withdrawn   40
  Empirical evidence  Expected effect on  
Bidder’s CARs 
Expected effect on  
Target’s CARs 
BIDDER & TARGET:  In pending acquisitions, the  gains for bidder’s  and target’s shareholders are  expected to fall as a 
reaction to ongoing uncertainty 
Unknown  (-) Pending  (-) Pending 
       
LEGAL STATUS OF THE TARGET FIRM:       
BIDDER: Takeover bids for privately-held companies may lead to higher bidder returns than do bids for public firms. The 
reason is that the shares of privately-held firms are by definition illiquid that may create a price discount. Also, takeover 
negotiations with the owners of a private firm may have a better chance of succeeding than when a public tender offer has to 
be launched for a widely-held firm (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997). Moreover, an all-equity offer to a private firm may 
create an outside blockholder in the bidding firm and hence bring about more managerial discipline (Chang, 1998). 
 
Moeller et al. (2004); 
Faccio et al. (2004); 
Fuller et al. (2002) 
(+) Private target   
BIDDER:  The  acquisition  of  a  private  firm  may  entail  considerably  more  risk  for  the  acquirer  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
information available about the true value and growth potential of the firm may be less reliable. Therefore, an acquisition of a 
private target may be followed by negative market reaction  
Bradley and Sundaram 
(2004) 
(-) Private target   
       
INDUSTRY SCOPE:       
BIDDER: Although diversifying (or conglomerate) acquisitions are expected to create operational and/or financial synergies, 
the creation of diversified firms is associated with a number of disadvantages such as rent-seeking behavior by divisional 
managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), bargaining problems within the firm (Rajan et al., 2000), or bureaucratic rigidity 
(Shin and Stulz, 1998). These disadvantages of diversification may outweigh the alleged synergies and result in wealth 
destruction for the shareholders of the bidding firm. Diversifying mergers themselves may be an outgrowth of the agency 
problems between managers and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). As such, they are expected to destroy value 
TARGET: Investors expect bidders pursuing diversification strategies to bid more aggressively and hence pay higher takeover 
premiums than do bidders adhering to a focus strategy. This is because diversifying acquisitions are more likely to occur 
when bidding firms suffer from agency conflicts and free cash flow problems. In the literature, there is evidence that the 
managers of such firms often acquire unrelated businesses for personal reasons at the expense of shareholder value (e.g. for 
‘empire building’ purposes), or that managerial hubris leads bidding firms to pay too high premiums. 
Morck et al. (1990); 
Maquieira et al. (1998); 





       
MEANS OF PAYMENT:       
BIDDER: If the managers of a bidding firm are convinced that the true value of their firm’s shares is higher than the current 
share price, they will prefer not to issue equity (to finance an all-equity bid or a mixed offer) and will rather offer to pay with 
cash. Hence, the market may interpret the financing choice as a signal about a firm’s under- or overvaluation and revise the 
share  price  of  the  firm  offering  cash  (equity)  upwards  (downwards)  (Myers  and  Majluf,  1984).  Thus,  a  negative  price 
correction is expected for all-equity bids and a positive one for all-cash bids. 
TARGET: A cash bid is interpreted as a positive signal about the target firm’s quality as the bidding firm is buying out the 
target shareholders and is hence not willing to share future value increases. Hence, the target’s share price rises more for an 
all-cash deal than for an equity exchange. 
 
Moeller et al (2004); 
Andrade et al. (2001);  
Franks et al. (1991) 
(-) Equity payment 
(+) Cash payment 
(-) Equity payment 
(+) Cash payment 
BIDDER & TARGET: Shareholders of the bidding and target firms get wary about the deal when the terms of the takeover are 
not disclosed. They may suspect that the transaction may lead to the expropriation of their rights either by the management or 
by the controlling shareholder. Therefore, share prices of both firms are expected to decline 





       
SUB-PERIODS OF THE 5




  Empirical evidence  Expected effect on  
Bidder’s CARs 
Expected effect on  
Target’s CARs 
BIDDER: The bidders bid more aggressively during the takeover wave peak, hence their gains are expected to decline 




(-) Peak of the 
takeover wave 
(+) Peak of the 
takeover wave 
BIDDER & TARGET: Takeovers occurring at a later stage  of the wave may suffer from limited information processing, 
managerial hubris, and managerial self-interest and hence trigger lower returns to bidder and target shareholders than do 
those at the beginning of the wave (Harford, 2003) 
 
Harford (2003); 
Moeller et al. (2005) 
(-) Later stage of the 
takeover wave 
(-) Later stage of 
the takeover 
wave 
BIDDER: High valuations realized during the periods of equity market booms increase managerial discretion, and make it 
possible for executives to make poor acquisitions when they have run out of good ones (Jensen, 2004). We expect more poor 
acquisitions in the later stage of the wave. 
Moeller et al. (2005)  (-) Peak and later 
stage of the 
takeover wave 
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Table 2. Sample composition and characteristics of M&A deals 
Panel A shows the number of all the takeover announcements and partitions this sample into: (i) domestic and cross-border deals; (ii) 
acquisitions of 100% control and acquisitions of partial control; (iii) friendly M&As, unopposed tender offers, and opposed (by the 
target’s board) bids; (iv) completed, pending, and withdrawn bids; (v) privately held and public target firms; (vi) diversifying deals and 
focus-oriented transactions, and (vii) all-cash, all-equity, mixed offers and deals with undisclosed terms of transaction. Panel B provides 
the characteristics of takeover transaction for the whole sample and for the sub-samples of takeovers launched by UK and CE firms. 
Mean [Median] values of the variables are reported. All variables are defined in Appendix II.  
 
 PANEL A: SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY M&A ANNOUNCEMENT YEAR 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  1993-2001 
                    %  Num 
                       
Total number of M&As  171  229  228  229  229  292  411  408  222    2,419 
% of all M&As in 1993-2001  7.1  9.5  9.4  9.5  9.5  12.1  17.0  16.9  9.2  100.0   
                       
  % OF M&A DEALS BY CATEGORY:     
Domestic bid  76.6  74.7  69.7  73.4  69.9  66.1  68.1  65.9  67.6  69.5  1,681 
Cross-border bid  23.4  25.3  30.3  26.6  30.1  33.9  31.9  34.1  32.4  30.5  738 
                       
Merger or Acquisition of 100%  55.6  54.1  60.5  62.9  60.3  37.7  37.2  41.7  39.6  60.0  1,451 
Acquisition of Partial Control (< 100%)  44.4  45.9  39.5  37.1  39.7  62.3  62.8  58.3  60.4  40.0  968 
                       
Opposed (by target’s board) bid  7.6  5.7  10.1  5.2  7.4  6.2  7.8  6.6  3.2  6.7  162 
Tender offer (unopposed by target’s board)  13.5  13.5  18.9  17.0  24.5  23.3  23.6  18.6  18.0  19.6  473 
Friendly M&A  78.9  80.8  71.1  77.7  68.1  70.5  68.6  74.8  78.8  73.7  1784 
                       
Completed bid  75.4  77.3  81.6  82.5  83.4  86.0  83.7  76.5  73.0  80.2  1,941 
Withdrawn bid  12.3  10.9  10.1  5.7  11.8  7.2  7.3  6.9  8.6  8.6  207 
Pending bid   12.3  11.8  8.3  11.8  4.8  6.8  9.0  16.7  18.5  11.2  271 
                       
Private target  69.0  69.9  62.7  72.9  62.0  62.0  54.5  62.7  62.6  63.2  1,530 
Listed target  31.0  30.1  37.3  27.1  38.0  38.0  45.5  37.3  37.4  36.8  889 
                       
Industry Focus (same 2-digit SIC code)  65.5  56.8  63.6  57.2  66.8  70.9  67.9  64.0  63.1  64.4  1,558 
Diversification (different 2-digit SIC code)  34.5  43.2  36.4  42.8  33.2  29.1  32.1  36.0  36.9  35.6  861 
                       
All-Cash bid  28.1  32.3  36.8  39.7  43.7  38.4  43.1  40.4  39.2  38.8  938 
All-Equity bid  19.3  15.7  13.6  11.4  17.9  10.3  14.6  15.0  14.0  14.4  349 
Mixed (Cash-and-Equity) bid  26.3  16.2  19.7  23.1  14.0  17.8  16.5  14.7  18.9  17.9  434 
Undisclosed terms  26.3  35.8  29.8  25.8  24.5  33.6  25.8  29.9  27.9  28.9  698 
                       
 PANEL B: CHARACTERISTICS OF M&A DEALS 
  Whole Sample  UK bidders  CE bidders 
  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med] 
       
Transaction value (US$ mln)  1,487   [24]  422     [16]  3,093   [59] 
Percentage of target shares the bidding firm intended to own after the bid  87.3     [100.0]  95.1    [100.0]  81.3     [95.0] 
Percentage of target shares the bidder accumulates prior to the bid (toehold)  4.6       [0.0]  2.3      [0.0]  6.4       [0.0] 
￿￿ Bidding firms that accumulate a toehold prior to the bid (%)  15.1  8.8  19.7 
￿￿ Toehold they accumulate (%)  30.1     [33.3]  25.7    [29.4]  31.6     [34.5] 




 Table 3. Sample composition by countries of bidding and target firms 
 
This table shows the number of all the takeover announcements by country and partitions this sample by: (i) domestic and cross-border deals, (ii) friendly M&As (excluding 
tender offers), unopposed tender offers, and hostile bids, (iii) and target and bidder country.   
 
    Domestic deals  Cross-border deals,  
Classification by bidder country 
Cross-border deals,  
Classification by target country 


























1  Austria  11  0.7%  11  0  0  31  4.2%  30  1  0  20  2.7%  16  1  3 
2  Belgium  23  1.4%  22  1  0  34  4.6%  28  5  1  14  1.9%  11  3  0 
3  Bulgaria  0  0.0%  0  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  2  0.3%  2  0  0 
4  Croatia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  6  0.8%  6  0  0 
5  Cyprus  3  0.2%  3  0  0  2  0.3%  1  1  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0 
6  Czech Rep.  9  0.5%  8  1  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  25  3.4%  25  0  0 
7  Denmark  30  1.8%  21  3  6  32  4.3%  25  6  1  21  2.8%  16  4  1 
8  Estonia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  13  1.8%  13  0  0 
9  Finland  53  3.2%  52  0  1  32  4.3%  29  2  1  20  2.7%  19  0  1 
10  France  219  13.0%  176  30  13  111  15.0%  92  10  9  89  12.0%  81  7  1 
11  Germany  175  10.4%  165  8  2  89  12.0%  71  14  4  94  12.7%  91  2  1 
13  Hungary  4  0.2%  4  0  0  5  0.7%  5  0  0  3  0.4%  3  0  0 
14  Ireland  11  0.7%  6  4  1  27  3.6%  18  7  2  16  2.2%  10  5  1 
15  Italy  39  2.3%  32  4  3  28  3.8%  24  3  1  44  5.9%  43  0  1 
16  Latvia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  4  0.5%  4  0  0 
17  Lithuania  1  0.1%  1  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  6  0.8%  5  1  0 
18  Luxemburg  0  0.0%  0  0  0  7  0.9%  6  1  0  5  0.7%  4  1  0 
19  Netherlands  2  0.1%  1  1  0  27  3.6%  16  10  1  45  6.1%  37  7  1 
20  Norway  58  3.5%  44  9  5  32  4.3%  29  1  2  37  5.0%  23  7  7 
21  Poland  22  1.3%  22  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  37  5.0%  34  3  0 
22  Portugal  1  0.1%  1  0  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  11  1.5%  10  1  0 
23  Romania  2  0.1%  2  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  11  1.5%  11  0  0 
24  Russia  10  0.6%  10  0  0  3  0.4%  3  0  0  10  1.4%  9  1  0 
25  Slovenia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  4  0.5%  2  2  0 
26  Spain  46  2.7%  33  6  7  9  1.2%  4  5  0  33  4.5%  30  3  0 
27  Sweden  102  6.1%  62  29  11  69  9.3%  59  7  3  48  6.5%  38  10  0 
28  Switzerland  22  1.3%  19  1  2  39  5.3%  26  10  3  28  3.8%  22  4  2 
29  UK  836  49.9%  483  274  79  159  21.5%  136  19  4  94  12.7%  41  40  13 
  Total  1679  100.0%  1178  371  130  740  100.0%  606  102  32  740  100.0%  606  102  32   44
Table 4.  Characteristics of bidding and target firms 
 
This table reports financial, accounting, and control structure characteristics of bidding and target firms and partitions this sample into 
UK and CE firms. All variables are  defined in Appendix II. The table reports  the  mean [median] values  of variables. For binary 
variables,  medians  are  omitted.  The  variables  Blockholder  >20%  and  Blockholder  >60%  are  binary:  they  equal  1  if  at  least  one 
blockholder reaches the specified percentage of voting rights. The mean values for these variables represent the percentage of firms with 
concentrated ownership in the analyzed sample. For private target companies, we assume that a single investor owns 100% of control. 
CE stands for Central European.  
 
  BIDDING FIRM    TARGET FIRM 
  All bidders  UK bidders  CE bidders    All targets  UK targets  CE targets 
  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med]    Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med] 
                           
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Market value (US$ mln)  2,572  [244]  2,418  [156]  2,691  [341]    929  [90]  699  [77]  1,159  [105] 
Q-ratio  2.51  [1.17]  3.20  [1.49]  2.04  [0.98]    1.50  [0.98]  1.40  [1.02]  1.62  [0.89] 
Number of observations  2,109    992    1,117      760    393    367   
                           
ACCOUNTING CHARACTERISTICS: 
Total Assets (US$ mn)  3,965  [316]  1,588  [136]  5,602  [468]    1,188  [153]  562  [103]  1,865  [245] 
Sales / Total Assets  1.23  [1.17]  1.36  [1.24]  1.14  [1.03]    1.31  [1.22]  1.44  [1.30]  1.16  [1.12] 
Cash Flow / Sales  0.07  [0.09]  0.07  [0.09]  0.08  [0.09]    0.09  [0.07]  0.05  [0.07]  0.14  [0.07] 
Investments / Total Assets  0.02  [0.01]  0.01  [0.00]  0.03  [0.01]    0.02  [0.00]  0.01  [0.00]  0.03  [0.01] 
Leverage    0.21  [0.18]  0.19  [0.15]  0.22  [0.21]    0.23  [0.20]  0.20  [0.18]  0.26  [0.24] 
Collateral   0.31  [0.27]  0.34  [0.29]  0.29  [0.25]    0.38  [0.33]  0.41  [0.37]  0.35  [0.30] 
Returns on Assets   0.28  [0.24]  0.36  [0.31]  0.22  [0.19]    0.28  [0.23]  0.37  [0.31]  0.18  [0.16] 
Number of observations  2,271    992    1,279      2,122    928    1,194   
                           
CONTROL STRUCTURE: 
Control (%)  31.7  [25.8]  13.6  [11.9]  38.8  [34.9]    78.4  [100.0]  74.2  [100.0]  81.4  [100.0] 
￿￿ Private Target  32.4  [26.7]  14.6  [10.6]  38.9  [35.0]    100.0  [100.0]  100.0  [100.0]  100.0  [100.0] 
￿￿ Listed Target  30.2  [23.0]  11.8  [8.3]  38.6  [34.9]    31.5  [26.9]  11.9  [9.9]  38.9  [34.9] 
Blockholder >20%   0.58    0.08    0.77      0.89    0.77    0.93   
￿￿ Private Target  0.60    0.10    0.78      1.00    1.00    1.00   
￿￿ Listed Target  0.53    0.07    0.75      0.67    0.08    0.81   
Blockholder >60%  0.16    0.02    0.21      0.74    0.71    0.75   
￿￿ Private Target  0.16    0.02    0.21      1.00    1.00    1.00   
￿￿ Listed Target  0.15    0.01    0.21      0.14    0.01    0.19   
Number of observations  1,582    624    958      2,006    704    1,302   




Table 5. Cumulative average abnormal returns of bidding and target firms by takeover characteristics. 
 
This table reports the average values of the CARs for bidding and target firms for 5 different event windows. T=0 stands for the day of the bid announcement. Abnormal returns are 
computed as the difference between the realized returns and the returns from the benchmark (the market model). The daily benchmark returns are based on the MSCI-Europe index and 
the parameters are estimated over a period of 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. A non-parametric Corrado test (Corrado, 1989) are used to assess the 
significance of the CAARs. Indicators a/b/c correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. The CAARs are classified by different characteristics of the 
takeovers bid: geographical scope, type of acquisition, form of and attitude towards the bid, bid completion status, legal status of the target firm, industry scope, means of payment, and 
the sub-periods of the 5










Entire period (short) 
[-5, +5] 




  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)   
WHOLE SAMPLE:                       
￿￿BIDDER  0.39  (0.76)  0.53  (4.90
a)  0.72  (4.28
a)  0.79  (3.19
a)  -2.83  (-2.48
b)  2109 
￿￿TARGET  11.49  (4.54
a)  9.13  (15.41
a)  12.47  (16.94
a)  15.83  (12.36
a)  26.70  (6.67
a)  760 
                       
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE:                       
￿￿BIDDER                       
Domestic bid  0.33  (0.51)  0.59  (4.36
a)  0.83  (3.95
a)  0.76  (2.56
b)  -2.49  (-1.80
c)  1456 
Cross-border bid  0.53  (0.62)  0.39  (2.25
b)  0.47  (1.72
c)  0.84  (1.90
b)  -3.63  (-1.77
c)  653 
Diff. Domestic bid – Cross-border bid  -0.20  (-6.29
a)  0.20  (5.04
a)  0.36  (5.17
a)  -0.07  (-1.13)  1.14  (23.40
a)   
￿￿TARGET                       
Domestic bid  11.13  (10.53
a)  9.65  (13.10
a)  12.55  (15.24
a)  15.61  (16.15
a)  26.84  (12.04
a)  564 
Cross-border bid  10.58  (10.25
a)  7.74  (6.13
a)  11.52  (7.42
a)  12.17  (2.60
a)  24.99  (10.22
a)  196 
Diff. Domestic bid – Cross-border bid  0.55  (3.10
a)  1.91  (8.83
a)  1.02  (2.65
a)  3.44  (8.54
a)  1.85  (6.53
a)   
                       
TYPE OF ACQUISITION:                       
￿￿BIDDER                       
Merger or Acquisition of 100%  1.32  (1.88
c)  0.61  (3.94
a)  0.92  (3.77
a)  1.04  (2.98
a)  -1.32  (-0.88)  1239 
Acquisition of Majority Control (< 100%)  -0.94  (-1.27)  0.41  (2.94
a)  0.42  (2.03
b)  0.42  (1.28)  -5.15  (-2.91
a)  869 
Diff. M&A of 100%  – M&A of Majority  2.26  (34.39
a)   0.20  (6.59
a)  0.50  (13.50
a)  0.62  (13.83
a)  3.83  (38.69
a)   
￿￿TARGET                       
Merger or Acquisition of 100%  13.09  (12.13
a)  11.55  (15.09
a)  15.61  (18.13
a)  19.46  (19.23
a)  31.26  (15.17
a)  563 
Acquisition of Majority Control (< 100%)  6.92  (3.96
a)  2.17  (2.97
a)  3.46  (3.86
a)  5.44  (4.05
a)  13.58  (3.38
a)  196 
Diff. M&A of 100%  – M&A of Majority  6.17  (28.94
a)  9.38  (58.42
a)  12.16  (70.23
a)  14.02  (71.09
a)  17.68  (57.20
a)   
       
FORM OF AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BID:       
￿￿BIDDER                       
Opposed (by target’s board) bid  1.63  (2.97
a)  -0.39  (-0.95)  -0.83  (-1.45)  -0.18  (-0.21)  -1.61  (2.29
b)  120 
Tender offer (unopposed by target’s board)  2.87  (2.55
b)  -0.37  (-1.48)  -0.45  (-1.14)  -0.29  (-0.52)  0.02  (0.01)  329 
Friendly M&A  -0.37  (-0.61)  0.78  (6.27
a)  1.06  (5.50
a)  1.07  (3.74
a)  -4.35  (-3.21
a)  1,659   46
 
 






Entire period (short) 
[-5, +5] 




  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)   
Diff. Tender Offer – Opposed bid  1.24  (4.44
a)  0.02  (0.13)  0.38  (2.04
b)  -0.11  (-0.51)  -9.19  (-19.78
a)   
Diff. Friendly M&A – Opposed bid  -2.00  (-35.35
a)  1.17  (16.82
a)  1.89  (21.74
a)  1.25  (11.91
a)  -13.57  (-61.77
a)   
￿￿TARGET                       
Opposed (by target’s board) bid  14.86  (6.96
a)  15.47  (7.48
a)  17.62  (9.15
a)  22.36  (10.13
a)  43.85  (13.11
a)  120 
Tender offer (unopposed by target’s board)  13.97  (10.59
a)  12.07  (12.79
a)  16.12  (15.27
a)  20.19  (16.75
a)  32.24  (14.66
a)  380 
Friendly M&A  6.20  (3.95
a)  2.75  (4.28
a)  4.59  (5.43
a)  6.25  (4.96
a)  10.22  (2.58
a)  259 
Diff. Tender Offer – Opposed bid  -0.89  (-2.74
a)  -3.40  (-6.54
a)  -1.51  (-5.02
a)  -2.17  (-6.75
a)  -11.61  (-28.01
a)   
Diff. Friendly M&A – Opposed bid  -8.66  (-21.95
a)  -12.72  (-31.10
a)  -13.03  (-39.04
a)  -16.11  (-42.69
a)  -33.63  (-59.38
a)   
                       
BID COMPLETION STATUS:                        
￿￿BIDDER                       
Completed bid  0.14  (0.25)  0.54  (4.62
a)  0.73  (4.08
a)  0.87  (3.22
a)  -2.79  (-2.13
b)  1705 
Withdrawn bid  1.08  (3.53
a)  -0.43  (-1.31)  -0.56  (-1.01)  -0.37  (-0.42)  -3.69  (-2.28
b)  162 
Pending bid  -1.05  (-0.65)  1.14  (2.77
a)  1.56  (2.37
b)  1.03  (1.22)  -6.38  (-1.98
b)  241 
Diff. Completed bid – Withdrawn bid  -0.94  (-8.16
a)  0.97  (15.26
a)  1.29  (16.05
a)  1.24  (12.39
a)  -3.88  (-17.93
a)   
Diff. Completed bid – Pending bid  1.20  (10.97
a)  -0.60  (-11.51
a)  -0.84  (-12.75
a)  -0.17  (-2.15
b)  3.59  (22.60
a)   
￿￿TARGET                       
Completed bid  12.27  (11.57
a)  9.20  (12.83
a)  12.29  (15.39
a)  15.86  (16.12
a)  27.85  (13.42
a)  568 
Withdrawn bid  13.87  (6.49
a)  7.95  (5.46
a)  12.82  (6.31
a)  15.38  (6.98
a)  34.31  (7.29
a)  135 
Pending bid  10.60  (3.87
a)  7.36  (3.03
a)  11.38  (3.99
a)  14.56  (3.81
a)  10.68  (4.86
a)  56 
Diff. Completed bid – Withdrawn bid  -1.60  (-8.97
a)  1.25  (5.33
a)  -0.53  (-2.02
b)  0.48  (1.72
c)  -5.96  (-14.66
a)   
Diff. Completed bid – Pending bid  1.66  (2.20
b)  1.84  (2.19
b)  0.91  (1.02)  1.30  (1.28)  18.17  (11.26
a)   
                       
LEGAL STATUS OF THE TARGET FIRM:       
￿￿BIDDER                       
Private target  -0.05  (-0.70)  0.77  (6.15
a)  1.08  (5.42
a)  1.06  (3.53
a)  -2.86  (-3.12
a)  1532 
Listed target  0.60  (3.37
a)  -0.12  (-0.56)  -0.25  (-0.83)  0.06  (0.15)  -1.35  (-0.78)  576 
Diff. Private target – Listed target  -0.65  (-13.41
a)  0.89  (26.48
a)  1.34  (32.22
a)  1.00  (20.07
a)  -1.51  (-10.56
a)   
                       
INDUSTRY SCOPE:                       
￿￿BIDDER                       
Industry Focus (same 2-digit SIC code)  1.43  (2.12
b)  0.63  (4.31
a)  0.85  (3.80
a)  0.98  (3.06
a)  -1.66  (-1.08)  1334 
Diversification (different 2-digit SIC code)  -1.41  (-1.85
c)  0.36  (2.35
b)  0.49  (1.99
b)  0.45  (1.19)  -5.04  (-3.00
a)  774 
Diff. Diversification – Focus   -2.84  (-42.61
a)  -0.27  (-9.01
a)  -0.36  (-9.56
a)  -0.53  (-11.43
a)  -3.39  (-33.96
a)   
￿￿TARGET                       
Industry Focus (same 2-digit SIC code)  10.41  (9.18
a)  8.39  (11.56
a)  11.83  (13.76
a)  15.16  (14.56
a)  24.34  (10.34
a)  525 
Diversification (different 2-digit SIC code)  13.92  (8.86
a)  10.78  (9.33
a)  13.91  (11.30
a)  17.36  (11.58
a)  31.98  (10.84












Entire period (short) 
[-5, +5] 




  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)   
Diff. Diversification – Focus   3.50  (15.82
a)  2.39  (14.29
a)  2.07  (11.68
a)  2.21  (11.29
a)  7.63  (26.85
a)   
                       
MEANS OF PAYMENT:       
￿￿BIDDER                       
All-Cash bid  0.72  (0.90)  0.55  (3.55
a)  0.80  (3.47
a)  1.03  (2.74
a)  -0.90  (-0.52)  754 
All-Equity bid  2.66  (1.68
c)  0.04  (0.09)  0.12  (0.19)  0.66  (0.75)  -2.16  (-0.61)  285 
Mixed (Cash-and-Equity) bid  0.01  (0.01)  0.87  (3.33
a)  1.17  (2.73
a)  1.03  (1.71
c)  -2.82  (-0.86)  412 
Undisclosed terms  -0.75  (-0.90)  0.51  (2.84
a)  0.60  (2.25
b)  0.41  (1.04)  -5.57  (-3.22
a)  657 
Diff. All-Cash bid – All-Equity bid  -1.94  (-12.90
a)  0.51  (29.70
a)  0.67  (24.93
a)  0.38  (9.71
a)  1.26  (7.64
a)   
Diff. All-Cash bid – Mixed bid  0.70  (5.57
a)  -0.32  (-5.84
a)  -0.38  (-5.40
a)  0.00  (0.06)  1.92  (9.99
a)   
Diff. All-Cash bid – Undisclosed bid  1.46  (15.70
a)  0.03  (0.77)  0.19  (3.71
a)  0.63  (9.80
a)  4.67  (34.24
a)   
Diff. All-Equity bid – Undisclosed bid  3.40  (21.27
a)  -0.48  (-6.10
a)  -0.48  (-4.94
a)  0.25  (2.18
b)  3.41  (14.47
a)   
￿￿TARGET                       
All-Cash bid  13.92  (10.56
a)  11.55  (12.09
a)  15.67  (15.03
a)  20.17  (15.74
a)  32.78  (13.23
a)  405 
All-Equity bid  7.39  (4.45
a)  7.29  (5.92
a)  9.22  (6.73
a)  11.10  (7.29
a)  18.16  (5.00
a)  185 
Mixed (Cash-and-Equity) bid  13.42  (5.28
a)  10.06  (7.43
a)  14.29  (8.80
a)  17.48  (9.89
a)  35.54  (8.64
a)  92 
Undisclosed terms  8.34  (2.43
b)  0.48  (0.96)  1.31  (1.19)  2.48  (1.27)  4.66  (0.61)  77 
Diff. All-Cash bid – All-Equity bid  6.03  (23.73
a)  3.77  (17.37
a)  6.45  (28.01
a)  9.07  (36.36
a)  14.62  (40.11
a)   
Diff. All-Cash bid – Mixed bid  -0.50  (-1.35)  -0.49  (-1.65
c)  1.37  (4.38
a)  2.69  (7.92
a)  -2.76  (-5.62
a)   
Diff. All-Cash bid – Undisclosed bid  5.07  (11.98
a)  10.57  (38.98
a)  14.36  (45.72
a)  17.69  (47.60
a)  28.12  (45.86
a)   
Diff. All-Equity bid – Undisclosed bid  -0.95  (-1.56)  6.80  (17.58
a)  7.91  (17.68
a)  8.62  (16.66
a)  13.50  (14.89
a)   
       
SUB-PERIODS OF THE 5
th TAKEOVER WAVE:       
￿￿BIDDER                       
1993-1996  -0.13  (-0.23)  0.32  (2.40
b)  0.46  (2.29
b)  0.65  (2.10
b)  0.52  (2.51
b)  761 
1997-1999  0.68  (2.75
a)  0.79  (4.60
a)  1.25  (4.44
a)  1.26  (3.01
a)  -1.30  (-1.58)  792 
2000-2001  0.67  (1.55)  0.45  (1.69
c)  0.31  (0.76)  0.30  (0.52)  -9.87  (-3.79
a)  555 
Diff. 1993/96 – 1997/99   -0.81  (-9.7
a)  -0.47  (-12.48
a)  -0.79  (-16.80
a)  -0.61  (-10.51
a)  1.82  (14.82
a)   
Diff. 1993/96 – 2000/01   -0.80  (-7.81
a)  -0.13  (-2.59
a)  0.15  (2.42
b)  0.34  (4.74
a)  10.39  (71.16
a)   
Diff. 1997/99 – 2000/01   0.01  (0.07)  0.34  (6.75
a)  0.94  (14.82
a)  0.95  (12.51
a)  8.57  (50.97
a)   
￿￿TARGET                       
1993-1996  7.87  (4.94
a)  7.57  (6.14
a)  10.26  (7.80
a)  13.07  (8.60
a)  25.14  (7.13
a)  217 
1997-1999  13.17  (9.49
a)  10.26  (11.39
a)  14.40  (13.30
a)  18.06  (14.33
a)  31.08  (12.86
a)  334 
2000-2001  12.59  (6.67
a)  8.92  (7.83
a)  11.68  (8.98
a)  15.15  (8.61
a)  21.29  (5.06
a)  208 
Diff. 1993/96 – 1997/99   -5.30  (-20.39
a)  -2.69  (-12.27
a)  -4.14  (-17.78
a)  -4.98  (-19.87
a)  -5.94  (-16.29
a)   
Diff. 1993/96 – 2000/01   -4.73  (-14.07
a)  -1.35  (-4.85
a)  -1.41  (-4.85
a)  -2.08  (-6.37
a)  3.85  (7.69
a)   
Diff. 1997/99 – 2000/01   0.58  (2.09
b)  1.34  (6.16
a)  2.73  (11.55
a)  2.91  (10.99
a)  9.79  (25.16
a)     48
Table 6. Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding and target firms by legal origin 
 
Panel A reports the average values of the CARs for bidding and target firms in domestic acquisitions by legal origin. Panel B reports the CAARs for bidding and target firms in cross-
border acquisitions classified by the legal origin of the bidder and target respectively. Countries are grouped according to their legal origin following the classification by LaPorta et al. 
(1998) and according to the EU enlargement process: English legal origin (Republic of Ireland and the UK), German legal origin (Austria, Germany, Switzerland), French legal origin 
(Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain), Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden,), EU enlargement (Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia). T=0 stands for the day of the bid announcement. Abnormal 
returns are computed as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns 
and the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. A non-parametric test (Corrado, 1989) is used to assess the 










Entire period (short) 
[-5, +5] 




  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)   
DOMESTIC BIDS:                       
￿￿BIDDER                       
English legal origin  0.67  (0.73)  0.41  (2.23
b)  0.50  (1.69
c)  0.49  (1.17)  -0.72  (-0.35)  744 
German legal origin  -3.68  (-2.64
a)  0.85  (2.20
b)  0.59  (1.44)  0.36  (0.49)  -10.34  (-2.71
a)  184 
Scandinavian legal origin  3.26  (1.96
b)  1.72  (3.34
a)  2.29  (3.17
a)  2.05  (2.39
b)  0.84  (0.25)  206 
French legal origin  1.40  (0.97)  0.12  (0.57)  0.92  (2.36
b)  1.30  (2.10
b)  -1.20  (-0.43)  278 
EU enlargement   -9.31  (-2.33
b)  0.32  (0.61)  -0.09  (-0.06)  -2.40  (-1.04)  -23.38  (-2.59
b)  44 
￿￿TARGET                       
English legal origin  14.21  (10.04
a)  13.66  (11.97
a)  17.64  (14.00
a)  21.87  (15.64
a)  36.79  (15.09
a)  306 
German legal origin  6.57  (2.11
b)  2.30  (2.68
a)  4.42  (3.17
 a)  5.71  (2.92
a)  6.40  (1.38)  48 
Scandinavian legal origin  9.72  (3.93
a)  11.10  (5.79
a)  14.78  (7.12
a)  15.56  (6.60
a)  25.65  (5.40
a)  76 
French legal origin  5.79  (2.25
b)  1.71  (3.13
a)  2.83  (3.18
a)  5.39  (3.20
a)  12.66  (1.76
c)  118 
EU enlargement   11.93  (1.65)  -0.48  (-0.45)  0.54  (0.18)  1.28  (0.41)  8.15  (0.55)  16 
                       
CROSS-BORDER BIDS:                       
￿￿BIDDER                       
English legal origin  -0.20  (0.14)  0.18  (0.60)  0.36  (0.62)  1.46  (1.77
c)  -1.17  (-0.56)  174 
German legal origin  2.28  (1.22)  0.43  (1.12)  0.66  (1.08)  1.29  (1.32)  -1.35  (-0.32)  137 
Scandinavian legal origin  -0.68  (-0.43)  0.78  (1.66
c)  0.67  (1.15)  0.59  (0.78)  -5.11  (-1.46)  149 
French legal origin  2.11  (1.47)  0.32  (1.18)  0.37  (0.84)  0.78  (1.10)  -1.00  (-0.33)  182 
￿￿TARGET                       
English legal origin  23.29  (5.29
a)  13.80  (6.04
a)  19.42  (7.52
a)  26.88  (8.93
a)  48.13  (7.86
a)  57 
German legal origin  9.37  (2.88
a)  3.48  (2.34
b)  7.06  (3.46
a)  5.49  (1.15)  11.25  (2.00)  33 
Scandinavian legal origin  7.24  (1.80
c)  12.38  (3.05
a)  17.32  (3.95
a)  19.28  (4.02
a)  22.71  (3.03
a)  38 
French legal origin  10.13  (3.62
a)  4.26  (2.96
a)  7.12  (3.80
a)  13.40  (4.58
a)  26.72  (4.38
a)  52 




Table 7. Anticipated wealth creation for bidders’ shareholders. 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CARs for three different event windows and for the sub-samples of UK and Continental European (CE) bidders. 
Variable definitions are given in Appendix II. ‘Heckman correction’ indicates that a Heckman (1976) sample selection is applied to correct for potential bias due to bidder’s 
endogenous choice of whether to participate in M&As or not. Where sample selection bias was found insignificant, we report estimates for OLS regression without Heckman’s 
correction. For each variable we list the coefficient and the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. Indicators a/b/c stand for statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
 
  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60] 
  All bidders  UK bidders  CE bidders  All bidders  UK bidders  CE bidders  All bidders  UK bidders  CE bidders 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val 
Intercept  0.01  .515  0.05  .301  0.02  .520  0.00  .445  0.01  .656  -0.00  .619  0.01  .799  0.01  .613  -0.01  .821 
Cross-border bid  0.00  .704  -0.02  .324  0.01  .472  -0.00  .229  -0.00  .720  -0.01  .122  0.01  .630  0.00  .916  0.01  .601 
M&A of 100%  0.01  .764  -0.04  .112  0.03  .112  0.01
a  .000  0.02
b  .026  0.01
b  .015  -0.01  .696  -0.01  .642  0.00  .838 
Opposed bid  0.03
a  .006  0.04
b  .028  0.03
a  .009  -0.02
b  .033  -0.03
b  .023  -0.01
b  .036  0.00  .937  0.05  .229  -0.02  .627 
Tender offer  0.02  .509  0.01  .730  0.00  .904  -0.02
a  .009  -0.03
a  .008  -0.01  .504  -0.01  .530  -0.00  .965  0.01  .870 
Withdrawn bid  0.00  .848  -0.01  .743  0.01  .779  -0.01  .396  0.00  .926  -0.02  .126  -0.03  .234  -0.09
a  0.04  0.00  .913 
Pending bid  -0.03  .193  -0.03  .398  -0.02  .346  0.01  .291  0.02  .320  -0.00  .574  0.00  .814  0.01  .762  -0.00  .887 
Private target  -0.01  .663  -0.01  .725  -0.01  .731  0.01
b  .044  0.02
c  .055  0.01
b  .021  -0.02  .258  0.00  .962  -0.03  .140 
Diversification  -0.03
b  .034  -0.01  .453  -0.03
b  .042  -0.00  .316  -0.00  .763  -0.01  .215  -0.00  .968  -0.01  .424  0.01  .466 
All-equity payment  0.03
b  .013  0.04
b  .013  -0.01  .111  -0.01
c  .090  -0.02
b  .017  -0.01
c  .057  -0.01  .441  -0.02  .465  0.00  .958 
Undisclosed terms  -0.02  .200  0.00  .950  -0.03
c  .090  -0.01
b  .024  -0.01  .411  -0.01
c  .078  0.00  .814  -0.02  .659  0.02  .216 
1997-1999  0.02  .297  0.02
b  .039  0.02  .552  0.01
b  .013  0.01  .265  0.02
a  .002  -0.01  .301  -0.03  .111  0.00  .947 
2000-2001  0.04  .147  0.02
b  .035  0.05  .220  -0.00  .438  -0.02
b  .030  0.01  .286  -0.11
a  .000  -0.06
a  .003  -0.13
a  .000 
Toehold           0.04  .505  -0.08  .481  0.06  .302  0.02  .225  0.04  .181  0.01  .633  0.12
b  .013  0.01  .919  0.15
b  .014 
Run-up              0.07
b  .013  0.06
b  .044  0.09
b  .021  0.06
c  .088  0.04  .105  0.05
c  .076 
Relative size  -0.04  .253  -0.09  .650  0.07  .402  -0.02  .395  -0.00  .962  -0.04
b  .036  -0.04  .423  -0.05  .742  -0.02  .825 
(Bidder) Q-ratio  0.02
a  .000  0.02
a  .000  0.02  .300  0.00  .123  0.00  .352  0.00  .654  -0.02
a  .000  -0.01
a  .000  -0.02
a  .002 
(Bidder) Leverage  -0.03  .804  0.02  .619  -0.00  .968  -0.03  .450  -0.07  .450  0.00  .942  0.21  .116  0.23  .284  0.20  .253 
(Bidder) CFlow/TA  -1.54
a  .000  -1.46
a  .000  -1.67
a  .006  -0.11  .238  -0.34
c  .061  0.15  .493  0.53  .425  0.57  .247  0.38  .438 
(Bidder) English  0.00  .748          -0.01
c  .057          0.02
b  .021         
(Bidder) Blockh>20%      0.04
c  .059  -0.02
c  .087      -0.04  .298  0.01  .449      -0.05  .585  0.02  .606 
(Target) Collateral   -0.04  .723  -0.18  .276  0.21
b  .037  0.03  .293  0.02  .605  0.05  .070  0.08  .259  0.07  .578  0.09  .323 
(Target) CFlow/TA  0.14  .395  0.33  .205  -0.03  .848  -0.00  .958  -0.00  .965  -0.02  .186  -0.29  .370  -0.26
b  .020  -0.30  .348 
(Target) English  -0.00  .804          0.00  .945          -0.01  .802         
                                     
Heckman correction  No    No    Yes    No    No    No    No    No    No   
Nr. of observations  2109    624    958    2109    624    958    2109    624    958   
Adjusted-R
2  0.14    0.17    0.13    0.06    0.05    0.04    0.13    0.08    0.16   
F-value  2.75  .004  4.02  .001  3.29  .003  4.67  .000  3.30  .002  3.18  .003  9.23  .000  6.55  .000  7.38  .000   50
Table 8. Economic effects of the results reported in Table 7: Predicted change in the wealth of the bidding 
firm’s shareholders around M&A announcement 
 
This table reports the economic effects of the results of the regressions of the bidder’s CARs for three different event windows 
and for the sub-samples of UK and Continental European (CE) bidding firms. The variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
The numbers in the table represent the incremental changes in CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic 
(binary  variables)  or  with  a  one  standard  deviation  change  in  the  reference  variable  (level  variables).  The  effects  that  are 
statistically significant in the regression analysis are denoted in bold. For each event window and each subsample of the bidding 
and target firms, the table also reports the average CARs.  
 
  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60] 


































Reference: CAARs (%)    0.64  0.95  -0.06    0.72  0.50  0.94    -3.35  -2.15  -4.55 
 
Incremental change in CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic (binary variable=1): 
Cross-border bid    0.46  -2.47  1.14  +/-  -0.47  -0.23  -0.68    0.59  0.32  0.82 
M&A of 100%    0.56  -4.28  2.98  +  1.38  1.71  1.22    -0.58  -1.04  0.33 
Opposed bid    3.20  3.86  2.78  -  -1.92  -3.22  -1.18    0.23  4.99  -1.92 
Tender offer    1.53  1.00  0.39  -  -1.64  -2.69  -0.61    -0.98  -0.13  0.63 
Withdrawn bid    0.47  -1.41  1.21  -  -0.74  0.12  -1.60  -  -3.22  -8.67  0.32 
Pending bid    -2.56  -2.80  -2.30  -  0.57  2.06  -0.36  -  0.39  1.16  -0.39 
Private target    -0.82  -1.09  -0.90  +  0.78  1.59  1.49  -  -2.03  0.29  -3.40 
Diversification    -2.67  -1.33  -3.47  -  -0.31  -0.14  -0.56    -0.09  -1.33  1.23 
All-equity payment    3.18  3.66  -0.53  -  -0.89  -1.79  -0.63    -1.33  -1.65  0.15 
Undisclosed terms    -2.09  0.27  -3.27  -  -1.02  -1.03  -0.90    0.35  -1.68  2.25 
1997-1999    2.17  1.75  2.24  -  0.97  0.67  1.56  -  -1.33  -2.86  0.09 
2000-2001    3.71  2.11  4.63  -  -0.33  -1.52  0.59  -  -10.82  -6.20  -13.18 
(Bidder) English    0.14        -1.12        2.40     
(Bidder) Blockh>20%      3.51  -2.37      -3.94  1.18      -5.35  2.23 
(Target) English    -0.02        0.04        -0.50     
 
Incremental change in CARs (%) associated with a one standard deviation change in a particular takeover variable: 
Toehold             0.45  -0.68  0.82    0.25  0.34  0.14    1.36  0.09  2.05 
Run-up            1.93  1.82  2.56    3.66  3.09  4.39 
Relative size    -0.89  -1.73  1.89    0.47  -0.09  -1.08    -0.89  -0.96  -0.54 
(Bidder) Q-ratio    10.23  12.92  7.79    1.22  1.63  0.88    -10.23  -6.46  -7.79 
(Bidder) Leverage    -0.49  0.36  0.03    -0.45  -1.26  0.02    3.42  4.13  3.00 
(Bidder) CFlow/TA    -16.66  -20.10  -13.46    -1.16  -4.68  1.21    5.73  7.85  3.06 
(Target) Collateral     -1.04  -4.88  5.22    -0.54  0.54  1.24    2.07  1.90  2.24 





Table 9. Anticipated wealth creation for targets’ shareholders. 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the target CARs for three different event windows and for the sub-samples of UK and CE targets. Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix II. For each variable we list the coefficient and the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. a/b/c stand for statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
 
  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60] 
  All targets  UK targets  CE targets  All targets  UK targets  CE targets  All targets  UK targets  CE targets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val 
Intercept  -0.03  .556  -0.05  .638  0.04  .461  0.03  .135  0.06  .349  0.01  .572  0.12
a  .001  0.00  .949  0.19
a  .000 
Cross-border bid  0.03  .418  0.13
b  .013  -0.02  .638  0.03
c  .096  0.03  .412  0.03
c  .056  -0.00  .873  0.02  .472  -0.02  .634 
M&A of 100%  0.02  .543  0.01  .918  0.03  .582  0.05  .214  0.04  .246  0.06  .118  0.05
c  .064  -0.00  .987  0.09
b  .046 
Opposed bid  0.09
b  .049  0.10
b  .028  0.12
c  .063  0.07
a  .002  0.13
b  .026  0.05
b  .034  0.07  .162  0.05  .314  0.09  .175 
Tender offer  0.06  .102  0.11  .228  0.05  .228  0.04
b  .048  0.11
b  .020  0.04  .117  0.01  .721  0.02  .726  0.01  .842 
Withdrawn bid  0.01  .762  0.07  .382  -0.03  .562  0.03  .214  0.08  .188  0.00  .928  -0.02  .596  0.06
c  .076  -0.08  .213 
Pending bid  -0.02  .703  -0.11  .656  -0.03  .647  0.03  .316  0.05  .471  0.01  .247  -0.13
a  .003  -0.22  .103  -0.14
b  .014 
Diversification  0.06
b  .036  0.05  .158  0.06
b  .032  0.02  .132  -0.00  .845  0.05
a  .002  0.01  .632  -0.02  .218  0.05  .175 
All-equity payment  -0.05  .119  -0.04  .304  -0.06  .208  -0.06
a  .000  -0.08
a  .003  -0.04
b  .028  -0.02  .439  0.02  .303  -0.05  .285 
Undisclosed terms  0.02  .281  0.02  .296  0.01  .139  -0.07
a  .010  -0.06  .485  -0.06
a  .007  -0.10
b  .016  -0.05  .941  -0.11
b  .034 
1997-1999  0.08
a  .010  0.13
a  .004  0.05
b  0.28  0.03
c  .089  0.03  .278  0.03  .104  -0.03  .203  0.03  .236  -0.13
a  .004 
2000-2001  0.08
b  .032  0.01  .573  0.09
b  .018  0.02  .356  0.03  .462  0.02  .410  -0.07
b  .016  0.00  .954  -0.16
a  .001 
Toehold           -0.17  .127  -0.15  .494  -0.19  .125  -0.12
b  .018  -0.07  .159  -0.29
b  .027  -0.22
a  .006  -0.08  .460  -0.28
b  .014 
(Target) Run-up              0.09
a  .000  0.03  .219  0.16
a  .000  0.06
c  .070  0.04  .351  0.09
b  .016 
Relative size  0.03  .783  0.04  .848  -0.04  .716  -0.03  .528  -0.10
c  .096  -0.00  .913  -0.04  .617  -0.08  .356  -0.09  .548 
(Bidder) Q-ratio  0.00  .815  0.00  .449  -0.03  .275  -0.00  .438  -0.00  .281  -0.00  .865  -0.01  .200  -0.00  .292  -0.01  .716 
(Bidder) Leverage  0.04  .712  -0.09  .644  0.16  .487  0.04  .604  0.10  .451  0.09  .434  0.01  .946  0.09  .368  -0.07  .792 
(Bidder) Cflow/TA  -0.03  .944  -0.21  .548  0.28  .741  -0.05  .776  0.12  .667  -0.30  .198  0.36
c  .078  0.21
c  .074  0.45
b  .047 
(Bidder) English  -0.06  .139          0.01  .683          0.00  .980         
(Bidder) Blockh>20%      -0.02  .289  0.00  .959      -0.01  .958  -0.04  .102      -0.01  .625  0.04  .316 
(Target) Collateral   0.00  .920  -0.16  .103  0.34
b  .013  -0.00  .765  -0.04  .411  0.04  .817  -0.04  .251  -0.01  .799  -0.06  .507 
(Target) CFlow/TA  -0.27  .123  -0.13  .630  -0.44  .159  0.03  .841  0.05  .712  0.02  .548  -0.10  .176  -0.11  .313  -0.22  .195 
(Target) English  0.11
b  .016          0.05
b  .032          -0.01  .704         
(Target) Blockh>20%      -0.03  .886  -0.01  .762      0.06  .567  0.01  .722      0.01  .870  0.06  .161 
                                     
Nr. of observations  758    251    225    758    251    225    758    251    225   
Adjusted-R
2  0.06    0.11    0.07    0.15    0.08    0.14    0.03    0.04    0.03   
F-value  3.72  .001  3.77  .001  4.58  .000  9.88  .000  3.52  .001  5.75  .000  2.94  .002  3.09  .002  2.80  .004   52
 
Table 10. Economic effects of the results reported in Table 9: Predicted change in the wealth of the target 
firm’s shareholders around M&A announcement 
 
This table reports the economic effects of the results of the regression of the target’s CARs for three different event windows 
and for the sub-samples of UK and CE target firms. The variable definitions are given in Appendix II. The numbers in the table 
represent the incremental changes in CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic (binary variables) or with a 
one  standard  deviation change in the reference  variable (level variables). The  effects that  are statistically significant in the 
regression analysis are denoted in bold. For each event window and each subsample of the bidding and target firms, the table also 
reports the average CARs.  
 
  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60] 

































                         
Reference: CAARs (%)    13.39  17.49  12.75    12.47  17.64  10.19    3.78  4.29  2.50 
 
Incremental change in CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic (binary variable=1): 
Cross-border bid    2.59  13.27  -1.69  +/-  2.68  2.54  3.02    -0.40  1.87  -1.79 
M&A of 100%    2.23  0.67  2.59  +  4.85  4.42  6.02    5.41  -0.05  9.49 
Opposed bid    9.23  10.07  11.68  +  7.41  13.23  5.77    7.19  5.01  8.81 
Tender offer    6.09  10.91  4.62  +  4.47  10.96  4.38    1.07  1.63  0.87 
Withdrawn bid    1.42  7.48  -3.40  +/-  3.13  8.83  0.24  +/-  -2.09  5.75  -7.96 
Pending bid    -2.28  -10.97  -2.84  -  2.90  4.84  0.96  -  -12.87  -21.69  -14.01 
Diversification    5.78  5.44  5.95  +  2.15  -0.46  5.12    1.07  -2.43  5.31 
All-equity payment    -4.72  -4.41  -5.53  -  -6.19  -8.03  -4.27    -1.99  2.35  -4.91 
Undisclosed terms    1.95  1.64  0.86  -  -6.51  -6.11  -6.04    -9.61  -5.11  -11.28 
1997-1999    8.32  13.47  4.61  +  2.73  2.89  3.09    -3.21  2.73  -12.78 
2000-2001    7.52  1.15  8.92  -  1.56  2.78  1.61  -  -6.88  0.16  -15.75 
(Bidder) English    -6.44        1.12        0.09     
(Bidder) Blockh>20%      -1.76  0.37      -0.54  -4.33      -1.18  3.59 
(Target) English    11.06      +  5.37        -1.48     
(Target) Blockh>20%      -3.34  -1.41      6.48  1.08      0.84  6.01 
 
Incremental change in CARs (%) associated with a one standard deviation change in a particular takeover characteristic: 
Run-up                       2.45  0.78  4.65    1.63  1.04  2.62 
Toehold             -1.92  -1.28  -2.59    -1.36  -0.60  -3.95    -2.49  -0.68  -3.82 
Relative size    0.67  0.77  -1.08    -0.67  -1.92  0.11    -0.89  -1.54  -2.43 
(Bidder) Q-ratio    1.02  1.01  -11.69    0.26  0.39  0.12    -5.12  0.52  -3.90 
(Bidder) Leverage    0.65  -1.62  2.40    0.65  1.80  1.35    0.16  1.62  -1.05 
(Bidder) CFlow/TA    -0.32  -2.89  2.26    -0.54  1.65  -2.42    3.89  2.89  3.63 
(Target) Collateral     0.01  -4.33  8.45    0.02  -1.08  0.99    -1.04  -0.27  -1.49 
(Target) CFlow/TA    -3.23  -1.41  -4.84    0.36  0.54  0.22    -1.20  -1.20  -2.42 
                       
 